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THE RIGHTS TO MARRY AND DIVORCE: A
NEW LOOK AT SOME UNANSWERED
QUESTIONS
CATHY J. JONES*
In 1978, the United States Supreme Court decided Zablocki v.
Redhail,t invalidating a Wisconsin statute that denied a marriage license
to any Wisconsin resident who was the noncustodial parent of minor
children and who was under a court order to support those children,
unless the applicant could prove that the support obligations had been
met and that the children neither were public charges nor were likely to
become public charges.2 Justice Marshall, writing for the majority and
employing an equal protection analysis, based the decision on the mar-
riage license applicant's right to marry.3
Although several years have passed since Zablocki, a number of ques-
tions raised by the opinion remain unanswered. Today, there is little
doubt that the right to marry is a "fundamental" right,4 but did that
right exist as a fundamental right prior to Zablocki, as Justice Marshall
* Associate Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law; B.A., Gettys-
burg College; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center; LL.M., Yale Law School. The author
wishes to acknowledge Howard I. Kalodner, Dean, Western New England College School of Law,
for providing institutional support that aided in the completion of this Article and Professor Anne
Goldstein, Western New England College School of Law; Professor Jay Katz, John A. Garver Pro-
fessor of Law and Psychoanalysis, Yale Law School; Professor Mary Margaret Stewart, Graff Pro-
fessor of English, Gettysburg College; and Professor Walter Wadlington, James Madison Professor
of Law, University of Virginia School of Law, for reading and commenting upon an earlier draft of
this Article. The author assumes all responsibility, however, for the contents of the Article.
1, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
2. Id.
3 Id. at 383-91.
4. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
Washington University Open Scholarship
578 WASHINGTON UNVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
indicated in his opinion, or did the Court in fact decree the right to be
fundamental in that case?5 After declaring marriage to be a fundamental
right, what standard did the Court apply in determining whether the
Wisconsin statute unconstitutionally restricted the right to marry and
was that standard appropriate?6 Is an equal protection approach appro-
priate in addressing an infringement on the right to marry or, as Justice
Stewart asserted in his concurring opinion in Zablocki,7 should the Court
have adopted a substantive due process approach?'
Two additional questions are also appropriate for consideration. First,
following Zablocki, what restrictions may states validly impose on indi-
viduals choosing to marry?9 Second, what is the status of the right to
divorce? Although the Supreme Court has never held the right to di-
vorce to be "fundamental,"' 1 Zablocki compels a closer examination of
the question."I As a result of Zablocki, what restrictions may states legit-
imately impose on married individuals desiring to dissolve their mar-
riages through divorce? Specifically, is Sosna v. Iowa, 2 a case in which
the Supreme Court held valid a one-year residency prerequisite for filing
for divorce, still good law?
This Article addresses the questions relating directly to the Supreme
Court's decision in Zablocki and those relating to state restrictions on
marriage and divorce. Part I of the Article explores the status of mar-
riage as a "fundamental" right. Part II examines the standard used by
the Zablocki Court to invalidate the Wisconsin statute. Part II also ad-
dresses the issues of whether the Court applied an appropriate standard
in reviewing the statute and whether Zablocki and subsequent cases
should be addressed as due process rather than as equal protection cases.
Part III sets forth some of the traditional restrictions states have placed
on individuals' decisions to marry (for example, age, mental competence,
incest) and some more modem restrictions (such as tax laws, nepotism
rules and prison marriage rules) that may be included within the
Zablocki approach, and discusses whether these restrictions must now
5. See infra notes 13-65 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 67-120 and accompanying text.
7. 434 U.S. 374, 391-96 (Stewart, J., concurring).
8. See infra notes 121-41 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 142-248 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 249-54 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 255-97 and accompanying text.
12. 419 U.S. 393 (1975). See infra notes 298-340 and accompanying text for a discussion of
state restrictions imposed on individuals seeking to dissolve their marriages through divorce.
[Vol. 63:577
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fall as unconstitutional restraints on the fundamental right to marry.
Part IV extends the right to marry into the realm of divorce and analyzes
whether the two rights are in fact opposites and whether the decision in
Zablocki should signal a new approach to state restrictions on divorce.
Throughout the Article the reader may ask whether states can finan-
cially afford to treat marriage as a fundamental right, whether society
views such treatment as morally "right," and whether such treatment is
even realistic if the outcome is the elimination of most or all current state
restrictions on marriage and divorce. Part V, which concludes the Arti-
cle, reviews this new look at the unanswered questions surrounding the
rights to marry and divorce and addresses the issue of theory versus real-
ity in the application of Zablocki.
I. MARRIAGE AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
In beginning the Court's evaluation of the Wisconsin statute at issue in
Zablocki,13 Justice Marshall declared the right to marry to be of "funda-
13. Wis. STAT. § 245.10 (1973) provided:
(1) No Wisconsin resident having minor issue not in his custody and which he is under
obligation to support by any court order or judgment, may marry in this state or else-
where, without the order of either the court of this state which granted such judgment or
support order, or the court having divorce jurisdiction in the county of this state where
such minor issue resides or where the marriage license application is made. No marriage
license shall be issued to any such person except upon court order. The court, within 5
days after such permission is sought by verified petition in a special proceeding, shall direct
a court hearing to be held in the matter to allow said person to submit proof of his compli-
ance with such prior court obligation .... Upon the hearing, if said person submits such
proof and makes a showing that such children are not then and are not likely thereafter to
become public charges, the court shall grant such order, a copy of which shall be filed in
any prior proceeding ... or divorce action of such person in this state affected thereby;...
Any hearing under this section may be waived by the court if the court is satisfied from an
examination of the court records in the case and the family support records in the office of
the clerk of court as well as from disclosure by said person of his financial resources that
the latter has complied with prior court orders or judgments affecting his minor children,
and also has shown that such children are not then and are not likely thereafter to become
public charges. No county clerk in this state shall issue such license to any person required
to comply with this section unless a certified copy of a court order permitting such mar-
riage is filed with said county clerk.
(4) If a Wisconsin resident having such support obligations of a minor, as stated in sub.
(1), wishes to marry in another state, he must, prior to such marriage, obtain permission of
the court under sub. (1) ....
(5) This section shall have extraterritorial effect outside the state; and [[sections of Wis-
consin law] providing that out-of-state marriages to circumvent Wisconsin law are void]
are applicable hereto. Any marriage contracted without compliance with this section,
where such compliance is required, shall be void, whether entered into in this state or
elsewhere.
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mental importance."14 In support of his characterization of the right to
(Language in single brackets in original; language in double brackets added.) Criminal penalties
could also attach to a marriage license applicant's failure to comply with § 245.10. Wis. STAT.
§ 245.30(1)(f) (1973).
The Wisconsin statute challenged in Zablocki applied not only to Wisconsin domiciliaries, but
also to all residents, to marriage license applicants regardless of where they chose to marry, and to
all noncustodial parents owing court-ordered support obligations to minor children regardless of
which state's court entered the order. Wisconsin, therefore, could have declared void the marriage
of a person who happened to be residing in Wisconsin for the purposes of attending college, even
though the person was a domiciliary of any other state, the intended spouse was a domiciliary of any
other state, the applicant was under a support order from any other state, and the applicant's minor
children were domiciliaries of any other state. The applicant in such a situation also could have been
subjected to criminal penalties for failure to comply with the Wisconsin statute.
14. 434 U.S. at 383. It is not altogether clear, however, how a right is determined to be "funda-
mental." Professors Nowak, Rotunda, and Young state that a court's decision to declare a right to
be fundamental "involves a judicial determination that the text or structure of the Constitution
evidences the existence of a value that should be taken from the control of the political branches of
government." J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at 594 n.21 (1983).
Little more than that can be said, they believe, to describe fundamental rights "because fundamental
rights analysis is simply no more than the modem recognition of.. .natural law concepts ...." Id.
at 457.
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), the Court stated
that it" 'does not "pick out particular human activities, characterize them as 'fundamental,' and give
them added protection .. " To the contrary, the Court simply recognizes, as it must, an established
constitutional right, and gives to that right no less protection than the Constitution itself demands.'"
Id 411 U.S. at 31 (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(emphasis in original)). The Court continued:
It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. Thus, the key to discovering whether education
[the issue in Rodriguez] is "fundamental" is not to be found in comparisons of the relative
societal significance of education as opposed to subsistence or housing. Nor is it to be
found by weighing whether education is as important as the right to travel. Rather, the
answer lies in assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaran-
teed by the Constitution. Id. at 333-34.
Justice Marshall disagreed with the Rodriguez Court's explanation of how a fundamental right is
determined to exist. In his dissenting opinion, he rejected the idea that only those rights "'explicitly
or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution'" are to be deemed fundamental. Id. at 100 (Marshall,
J., dissenting); see also id. at 62 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Especially significant to the Zablocki
opinion was the statement in Justice Marshall's Rodriguez dissent that:
I would like to know where the Constitution guarantees the right to procreate, or the right
to vote in state elections, or the right to an appeal from a criminal conviction. These are
instances in which, due to the importance of the interests at stake, the Court has displayed
a strong concern with the existence of discriminatory state treatment. But the Court has
never said or indicated that these are interests which independently enjoy full-blown con-
stitutional protection.
Although not all fundamental interests are constitutionally guaranteed, the determination
of which interests are fundamental should be firmly rooted in the text of the Constitution.
The task in every case should be to determine the extent to which constitutionally guaran-
teed rights are dependent on interests not mentioned in the Constitution. As the nexus
between the specific constitutional guarantee and the nonconstitutional interest draws
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol63/iss4/2
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marry as a "fundamental liberty,"' I. "fundamental,"' 6 of "fundamental
character,"' 7 and a "freedom of choice [which is] fundamental"' 8 he
cited a long list of prior Supreme Court cases, 19 many of which dealt
with privacy issues.20 Although Justice Marshall wrote that these deci-
sions "confirm that the right to marry is of fundamental importance for
all individuals[,]"'" not a single case cited by the Zablocki Court in sup-
port of the proposition that marriage is a fundamental right was directly
on point and none was a case dealing with a restriction upon marriage.22
The Supreme Court opinion coming closest to holding marriage to be a
closer, the nonconstitutional interest becomes more fundamental and the degree of judicial
scrutiny applied when the interest is infringed on a discriminatory basis must be adjusted
accordingly. Thus, it cannot be denied that interests such as procreation, the exercise of
the state franchise, and access to criminal appellate processes are not fully guaranteed to
the citizen by our Constitution. But these interests have nonetheless been afforded special
judicial consideration in the face of discrimination because they are, to some extent, inter-
related with constitutional guarantees. Procreation is now understood to be important be-
cause of its interaction with the established constitutional right of privacy. Only if we
closely protect the related interests from state discrimination do we ultimately ensure the
integrity of the constitutional guarantee itself. This is the real lesson that must be taken
from our previous decisions involving interests deemed to be fundamental. Id. at 101-03
(citations omitted).
15. 434 U.S. at 383.
16. Id. at 385 n.10.
17. Id. at 386.
18. Id. at 387.
19. Justice Marshall cited: Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977); Carey v.
Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977);
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973); Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); May-
nard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
20. As Justice Marshall stated in Zablocki:
It is not surprising that the decision to marry has been placed on the same level of
importance as decisions relating to procreation, childbirth, child rearing, and family rela-
tionships. As the facts of [ZablockiJ illustrate, it would make little sense to recognize a
right of privacy with respect to other matters of family life and not with respect to the
decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation of the family in our society.... [I]f
appellee's right to procreate means anything at all, it must imply some right to enter the
only relationship in which the State of Wisconsin allows sexual relations legally to take
place.
434 U.S. at 386 (footnote omitted).
21. Id. at 384.
22. Months before deciding Zablocki, the Court had decided Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47
(1977), another case concerning marriage. The Jobst Court, however, did not declare marriage to be
a fundamental right. In terms of direct relevance to the right to marry of those cases cited by the
Zablocki Court, restrictions upon divorce arguably do restrict the right to marry. See infra Section
IV(A). But while the Court in Boddie v. Connecticut made reference to the right to marry, see, eg.,
401 U.S. 371, 374, 376, 381, the decision in Boddie was based primarily upon the facts that the state
Washington University Open Scholarship
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fundamental right, and often cited as having settled the issue,2 3 is Loving
v. Virginia." While the Loving Court referred to the "freedom to marry"
as "one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men[,]" 25 as "one of the 'basic civil rights of man,'
fundamental to our very existence and survival[,]" 26 and as a "fundamen-
tal freedom,"27 Loving did not establish marriage as a fundamental right.
Loving v. Virginia, in which the Court struck down a Virginia statute
prohibiting marriages between blacks and whites, was first and foremost
an equal protection case dealing with discrimination based on race.28 Six
of the opinion's twelve pages dealt directly with constitutional issues.
More than five of the six pages focused on the equal protection/race dis-
crimination issue.29 Only a portion of the final page discussed the sub-
stantive due process/right to marry issue.3 0  Although the Court may
have added the latter discussion to bolster the equal protection section of
its opinion, the due process discussion was unnecessary to the holding
and to the remainder of the decision.' The language within the opin-
ion's equal protection section also made clear that the right to marry was
of secondary concern to the Court.32 Furthermore, the opinion's due
monopolized the means of dissolving marriage and that state required filing fees and court costs
denied indigent divorce litigants procedural due process, rather than upon the right to marry.
23. See, eg., Holt v. Shelton, 341 F. Supp. 821, 822-23 (M.D. Tenn. 1972).
24. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
25. Id. at 12.
26. Id. at 12 (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) and citing Maynard v.
Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888)).
27. 388 U.S. at 12.
28. Accord Zablocki 434 U.S. 374, 398 (Powell, J., concurring); Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn.
310, 314, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (1971).
29. 388 U.S. at 7-12.
30. Id at 12.
31. See Note, Constitutional Law-Family Law-Right to Marry Deemed Fundamental Right,
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), 1979 Wis. L. REv. 682, 685 n.24.
32. The Court stated:
While the state court is no doubt correct in asserting that marriage is a social relation
subject to the State's police power, the State does not contend in its argument before this
Court that its powers to regulate marriage are unlimited notwithstanding the commands of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor could it do so....
388 U.S. at 7 (citations omitted). The Court continued, "In the case at bar, however, we deal with
statutes containing racial classifications, and the fact of equal application does not immunize the
statute from the very heavy burden ofjustification which the Fourteenth Amendment has tradition-
ally required of state statutes drawn according to race." Id. at 9. Later in the opinion the Court
explained:
At the very least, the Equal Protection Clause demands that racial classifications, espe-
cially suspect in criminal statutes, be subjected to the "most rigid scrutiny," .... and, if they
are ever to be upheld, they must be shown to be necessary to the accomplishment of some
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol63/iss4/2
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process section, in which the right to marry was discussed, contained no
analysis in terms of what scrutiny should be applied when the right is
infringed. In the equal protection section, on the other hand, the Court
discussed the standard that the discriminatory classification had to sat-
isfy were it to be held valid.33
Although some courts, including the District Court in Zablocki, 4 cite
Loving for the proposition that marriage is a fundamental right,3 5 other
courts do not interpret Loving in that manner. 6 In Califano v. Jobst,7
for example, the United States Supreme Court mentioned Loving only in
reference to "stereotyped generalizations about a traditionally disadvan-
taged group,"3" and to "foist[ing] orthodoxy on the unwilling by ban-
ning, or criminally prosecuting, nonconforming marriages."3 9 Although
the Court in Jobst made reference to "a decision as important as mar-
riage[,]"'  the Court did not cite Loving as support.4
The Zablocki Court cited only two other cases with any direct rela-
tionship to marriage, Boddie v. Connecticut42 and Maynard v. Hill,4"
permissible state objective, independent of the racial discrimination which it was the object
of the Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate.
It at 11. (Citation omitted.) The Court concluded its equal protection analysis by stating: "There
can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates
the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause." Id at 12.
33. Id. at 8-11.
34. Redhail v. Zablocki, 418 F. Supp. 1061 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
35. See, e.g., O'Neill v. Dent, 364 F. Supp. 565, 568-69 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Holt v. Shelton, 341
F. Supp. 821, 822-23 (M.D. Tenn. 1972); Prout v. Maine Employment Sec. Comm'n, 462 A.2d 1177,
1178 n.3 (Me. 1983). Likewise, some scholars have found the right to marry enunciated in Zablocki
to be an extension of the right the Court set forth in Loving. See, eg., Karst, The Freedom of
Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.1 624, 667 (1980); Wadlington, Artificial Conception: The Chal-
lenge for Family Law, 69 VA. L. REv. 465, 510 n.164 (1983).
36. See, e-g., Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 314, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (1971); In re Ann
Goalen, 30 Utah 2d 27, 30 n.6, 512 P.2d 1028, 1030 n.6 (1973). Legal scholars also appear on the
side of the argument that Loving v. Virginia did not establish marriage as a fundamental right. See,
e.g., Bratt, Incest Statutes and the Fundamental Right of Marriage" Is Oedipus Free to Marry?, 18
FAM. L.Q. 257, 262 (1984); LeFrancois, The Constitution and the 'Right' to Marry: A Jurispruden-
tial Analysis, 5 OKLA. CrrY U.L. REv. 507, 522 n.48 (1980); Developments-The Constitution and
the Family, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1156, 1249 (1980).
37. 434 U.S. 47 (1977). Jobst involved a challenge to Social Security regulations terminating
benefits upon the recipient's marriage to a nonbeneficiary.
38. Id. at 54 & n.10.
39. Id. at 54 n.11.
40. Id. at 54.
41. 434 U.S. at 54 n.1 I. Subsequently, the Court in Zablocki did not cite Jobst, involving an
asserted restriction on marriage and decided just months before Zablocki, in support of its position
that marriage constitutes a fundamental right.
42. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
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both divorce cases. Although the Boddie Court referred to "the basic
position of the marriage relationship in this society's hierarchy of val-
ues[,]"'  to marriage as "involv[ing] interests of basic importance in our
society[,]"'4 5 and to the right to divorce as "the exclusive precondition to
the adjustment of a fundamental human relationship[,]" 46 the issue in the
case was whether indigent divorce litigants who could not pay state-re-
quired court fees and costs were denied procedural due process. The
Court held that their rights were denied. While language in Boddie,
when combined with the Court's decision in Zablocki, may lend support
to the existence of a fundamental right to divorce,47 the case is not au-
thority for the holding that marriage is a fundamental right.
Maynard involved property in the estate of a husband previously
granted a legislative divorce in the Territory of Oregon without notice of
the divorce having been given to the nonresident wife. Again, while the
Court referred to marriage "as creating the most important relation in
life, as having more to do with the morals and civilization of a people
than any other institution,"4 the Court's primary concern in talking of
marriage was the power of the state to regulate all aspects of marriage
and divorce.49
The remaining cases the majority opinion cited in Zablocki to support
the proposition that marriage is a fundamental right ° are even less per-
suasive authority. Three of the cases the Court cited involved issues of
procreation.5 1 Several concerned other family-related issues.5 2 A final
43. 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
44. 401 U.S. at 374.
45. Id. at 376.
46. Id. at 383.
47. See infra Section IV(A).
48. 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
49. Id.
50. See supra note 19 and cases cited therein.
51. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), which referred to marriage and procreation as
being "fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race[,]" id. at 541, and which is the
source of the "one of the basic civil rights of man" language, id., quoted in so many of the pri-
vacy/procreation/family-related decisions, invalidated a statute compelling sterilization of certain
felons. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Court held unconstitutional as a viola-
tion of marital privacy a state statute forbidding married couples to use contraceptives. The Court
there referred to marriage as:
a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of
being sacred .... (Ain association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in
living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an
association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.
Id. at 486. See also Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut in which he
[Vol. 63:577
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group was totally unrelated to marriage or other family matters.5 3 Fur-
thermore, many of the later cases the Court cited in Zablocki relied for
their authority upon the earlier cases cited in Zablocki.54 Rather than
"confirm[ing] that the right to marry is of fundamental importance for
all individuals,"55 these cases form an interlocking network of citations
finds a fundamental right to marital privacy in the penumbras of the ninth amendment to the Consti-
tution. Id. at 486-87, 491-92, 495-96. In Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l., 431 U.S. 678 (1977), a
case concerning a New York law placing restrictions on the sale of contraceptives, the Court referred
to marriage as a decision "that an individual may make without unjustified government interfer-
ence." Id. at 685.
52. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), in which the Court included the right to marry
within the concept of "liberty," id. at 399, involved a statute forbidding the teaching of any modern
language other than English to children before they entered the ninth grade. Cleveland Bd. of Educ.
v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), in which the Court referred to recognition of "that freedom of
personal choice in matters of marriage and family life[,]" id. at 639, concerned a challenge to school
board regulations mandating maternity leave for pregnant teachers five months before their expected
childbirth date. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), in which the Court repeated
the above-quoted passage from LaFleur, id. at 499, involved a challenge to a housing regulation
containing a restrictive definition of the word "family." (See also the references in Justice Stewart's
dissenting opinion to aspects of private family life such as the freedom to marry a person of another
race that is constitutionally protected from state interference and to "fundamental decisions to
marry and to bear and raise children.") Id at 536, 537 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Finally, Smith v.
Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977), in which the Court quoted language from both Gris-
wold. id. at 843-44, and LaFleur, id. at 842, concerned a challenge to a New York regulation gov-
erning the removal of children from foster families.
53. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), where" 'matters relating to marriage'" were given as
an example of an "interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions[,]" id. at
599-600 & n.26 (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976)), involved a challenge to drug law
record keeping requirements. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), which characterized "matters
relating to marriage" as "fundamental," id. at 713, concerned an allegation of a civil rights act
violation, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981). Finally, United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973), in which the
Court distinguished Boddie and referred to the marital relationship as "fundamental," id. at 444,
446, involved a challenge to filing fees in a bankruptcy case brought by an indigent petitioner. See
also Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion in Kras in which he rejected the notion that the Court's
decision in Boddie was based on "any subjective conception of the 'fundamentality' of marriage, or
divorce ...." 409 U.S. at 456 n.7 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Rather, Justice Stewart indicated, the
Court decided Boddie as it did because the state monopolized the means for dissolving a marriage.
Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
54. The Court in Boddie v. Connecticut cited Loving, Skinner, and Meyer. 401 U.S. 371, 376.
The Court in Kras cited Boddie, Loving, Griswold, Skinner, and Meyer. 409 U.S. 434, 444. In Cleve-
land Bd. of Educ., the Court cited Loving, Griswold, Skinner, and Meyer. 414 U.S. 632, 639-40. The
Court in Whalen v. Roe cited Davis, Loving, Griswold, and Meyer. 429 U.S. 589, 600 n.26. In Moore
v. City of East Cleveland, the Court cited Lafleur, Loving, Skinner, and Meyer. 431 U.S. 494, 499.
In Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l. the Court referred to Lafleur, Loving, Skinner, and Meyer. 431
U.S. 678, 685. And in Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, the Court cited Moore, Lafleur, Loving,
Griswold, Skinner, and Meyer. 431 U.S. 816, 842, 843, 844, 845.
55. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384.
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56that, at best, relate only peripherally to the right to marry.
Two other factors indicate that prior to the Court's decision in
Zablocki the right to marry was not afforded "fundamental" status for
purposes of Constitutional review.
First, in Sosna v. Iowa,5 7 the divorce residency requirement case, Jus-
tice Marshall dissented from the Court's refusal to apply a fundamental
rights analysis, arguing that "it is clear beyond cavil that the right to seek
dissolution of the marital relationship is of such fundamental impor-
tance" that a heightened scrutiny should be applied in evaluating the
requirement.5" In his dissent, however, Justice Marshall did not pinpoint
any precise authority declaring marriage to be a fundamental right. In-
stead, he quoted some of the same language and cited some of the same
cases that he later relied upon in Zablocki.59
Second, the separate opinions of Justices Stewart, Powell, and Rehn-
quist in Zablocki indicate that the right to marry did not exist as a funda-
mental right prior to Zablocki. Although agreeing that "in regulating
the intimate human relationship of marriage, there is a limit beyond
which a State may not constitutionally go[,]" 60 Justice Stewart rejected
the notion that a constitutional right to marry existed.61 Justice Powell,
although stating that "it is fair to say that there is a right of marital and
familial privacy which places some substantive limits on the regulating
power of government[,]" also concluded that "the Court has yet to hold
that all regulation touching upon marriage implicates a 'fundamental
right' triggering the most exacting judicial scrutiny. '62  Justice Powell
56. It also may be that the Court's early use of the word "fundamental" in privacy related areas
such as the childbearing cases was not meant to afford the right so described special deference under
the Constitution, but rather was employed only "as a way of expressing the importance of the inter-
est." Bennett, Abortion and Judicial Review: Of Burdens and Benefits, Hard Cases and Some Bad
Law, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 978, 987 n.40 (1981).
57. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
58. Id at 420 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
59. The previous decisions of this Court make it plain that the right of marital association
is one of the most basic rights conferred on the individual by the State. The interests
associated with marriage and divorce have repeatedly been accorded particular deference,
and the right to marry has been termed "one of the vital personal rights essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). In
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), we recognized that the right to seek dissolu-
tion of the marital relationship was closely related to the right to marry, as both involve the
voluntary adjustment of the same fundamental human relationship. Id. at 383.
419 U.S. at 419-20 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
60. 434 U.S. 374, 392 (Stewart, J., concurring).
61. Id (Stewart, I., concurring).
62. Id. at 397 (Powell, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). See infra notes 103-14 and accompa-
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wrote in his concurring opinion that while the privacy-liberty line of
cases that the majority cited "indicate[s] that there is a sphere of privacy
or autonomy surrounding an existing marital relationship into which the
State may not lightly intrude, they do not necessarily suggest that the
same barrier of justification blocks regulation of the conditions of entry
into or the dissolution of the marital bond."63 Justice Rehnquist in dis-
sent rejected the propositions that marriage is a fundamental right and
that the right justifies anything greater than rational basis scrutiny."
Whether or not the right to marry existed as a fundamental right prior
to Zablocki, it has clearly been referred to as fundamental since that deci-
sion.65 Traditionally, when states have restricted fundamental rights,
nying text for a discussion indicating that the majority's opinion in Zablocki could be read as afford-
ing marriage fundamental right status, but not according it "the most exacting judicial scrutiny"
standard of review.
63. Id. at 397 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring; emphasis added; citation omitted).
64. Id. at 407 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
65. Druker v. Comm'r, 697 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2429 (1983)
(income tax "marriage penalty" held valid); Murillo v. Bambrick, 681 F.2d 898, 902, 903 n.9 (3d
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982) (upheld special matrimonial litigation fee imposed by
New Jersey); Ensminger v. Comm'r, 610 F.2d 189, 193 (4th Cir. 1979) (challenge, in tax case, to
local law prohibiting adult individuals from living together without benefit of marriage; held ques-
tion of constitutionality of local law is matter to be left to state, not Commissioner); Mapes v. United
States, 576 F.2d 896, 901 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (upheld validity of different tax rates applicable to married
and unmarried taxpayers); Salisbury v. List, 501 F. Supp. 105, 108 (D. Nev. 1980) (held prison
regulation concerning inmate marriage procedure unconstitutional); Southwestern Community Ac-
tion Council, Inc. v. Community Servs. Admin., 462 F. Supp. 289, 296 (S.D. W. Va. 1978) (upheld
agency regulation prohibiting employment of person by agency in position over which member of
employee's immediate family exercised supervisory authority or served on board or committee with
personnel authority); Helvey v. Rednour, 86 Ill. App. 3d 154, 158, 408 N.E.2d 17, 21 (1980) (par-
ent's due process and equal protection rights violated by section of adoption act giving guardian ad
litem of mentally ill parent authority to consent to adoption of parent's child); Miller v. Morris, 270
Ind. 505, 507, 386 N.E.2d 1203, 1204 (1979) (held unconstitutional Zablocki-type statute providing
that person with dependent children would be denied marriage license unless person could prove
compliance with court-ordered support); Browder v. Harmeyer, 453 N.E.2d 301, 305 (Ind. App.
1983) (no due process violation occurred in proceedings awarding adoption to maternal grandpar-
ents); Prout v. Maine Employment Sec. Comm'n, 462 A.2d 1177, 1178 n.3 (Me. 1983) (Court need
not reach question of violation of constitutional right to marry where employee denied unemploy-
ment compensation benefits for leaving employment prior to marriage in light of company's policy
against employing persons related to each other because at time employee left employment company
had not decided whether to enforce rule); People v. De Stefano, 121 Misc. 2d 113, 121, 467 N.Y.S.2d
506, 513 (Suffolk Co. 1983) (statute granting husband immunity from prosecution for rape of wife
violates equal protection clause); but see Wool v. Hogan, 505 F. Supp. 928, 932 (D. Vt. 1981) (prison
inmate's right to go through marriage ceremony absent ability to cohabit, have sexual relations or
procreate, does not in and of itself amount to a fundamental right).
Legal scholars have agreed with the courts that marriage is now a fundamental right. See, e.g..
Bennett, supra note 56 at 978, 1003 n.99; Garfield, The Transitory Divorce Action: Jurisdiction in the
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courts have applied strict scrutiny in evaluating the validity of the re-
strictions.6 6 Questions remain, however, concerning the standard of re-
view applied to the Wisconsin statute in Zablocki and the standard to be
applied in future marriage restriction cases.
II. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. The Test
In characterizing the scrutiny to be accorded Wisconsin's infringement
on the right to marry, Justice Marshall wrote, "Since our past decisions
make clear that the right to marry is of fundamental importance, and
since the classification at issue here significantly interferes with the exer-
cise of that right, we believe that 'critical examination' of the state inter-
No-Fault Era, 58 TEX. L. REV. 501, 518-19 (1980); Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage,
Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463,
509 (1983); Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 627, 668 n.203 (1980);
Leedes, The Supreme Court Mess, 57 TEx. L. REV. 1361, 1400, n.233 (1979); LeFrancois, supra note
36 at 507, 523; Comment, A ConstitutionalAnalysis of Pennsylvania's Restrictions Upon Marriage, 83
DICK. L. REv. 71, 72, 73 (1978); Developments, supra note 36 at 1156, 1165; Note, Califano v. Jobst
Zablocki v. Redhail, and the FundamentalRight to Marry, 18 J. FAM. L. 587, 587 (1979-80); Note,
supra note 31, at 682, 684, 689; Note, Marital Status Discrimination: A Survey of Federal Caselaw,
85 W. VA. L. REV. 347, 360 (1983); Note, The Constitutionality of Parental Consent Requirements in
Minor Marriages, 12 U.C.D. L. REV. 301, 308 (1979); Note, Zablocki v. RedhaiL" Due Process or
Equal Protection, 12 U.C.D. L. REV. 165, 166 (1979). But see Address of Professor Anthony Amster-
dam, Annual Judicial Conference, Second Judicial Circuit 1982, 97 F.R.D. 545, 617 (1982) ("the
right to marry is not, as such, one which is explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution");
Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569, 1625-26 (1979) ("[T]here is a range of
rights--some more fundamental, some less.... Marriage and divorce seem both to be 'somewhat'
fundamental." (Footnotes omitted, but comparing Zablocki with Jobst, and Boddie with Sosna));
Recent Cases, Constitutional Law-Fourteenth Amendment-Equal Protection-Domestic Rela-
tions-Marriage-A Wisconsin Statute Restricting the Right to Marry of Those Under an Obligation
to Support Minor Children Not in Their Custody Violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment-Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), 47 U. CIN. L. REV. 334, 339 (1978)
(because the Court did not apply "strict scrutiny" to the statute in Zablocki, "it would seem that the
right to marry is less fundamental than those other fundamental rights").
66. See, eg., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976); id. at 319
(Marshall, J., dissenting); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434,446 (1973); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Seoane v. Ortho Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 660 F.2d 146, 149 (5th Cir. 1981);
Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1172 (5th Cir. 1979); Mapes v. United States, 576 F.2d
896, 901 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Dixon v. McMullen, 527 F. Supp. 711, 720 (N.D. Tex. 1981). See also J.
NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra note 14, at 591-92 (1983); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW § 16-6 at 1000 (1978); Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judi-
cial Review and Democratic Theory, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1049, 1054 (1979); Gunther, Foreword: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol63/iss4/2
Number 4] RIGHTS TO MARRY AND DIVORCE
ests advanced in support of the classification is required." 67 Later, in
limiting the cases to which Zablocki would apply, Justice Marshall ex-
plained, "By reaffirming the fundamental character of the right to marry,
we do not mean to suggest that every state regulation which relates in
any way to the incidents of or prerequisites for marriage must be sub-
jected to rigorous scrutiny., 6  Finally, Justice Marshall stated specifi-
cally the test to be applied: "When a statutory classification significantly
interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld
unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is
closely tailored to effectuate only those interests., 69
The unresolved question, however, is the exact nature of the scrutiny
to be applied when states attempt to restrict marriage. Is it strict scru-
tiny, requiring the classification to serve a compelling state interest and
to be the least restrictive alternative available to the state to achieve its
objective? Or, has Zablocki, with its "sufficiently important state inter-
ests" and "closely tailored" language, established that a lesser scrutiny is
appropriate when dealing with restrictions on marriage, even if the right
to marry is "fundamental?"
Justice Stevens, concurring in Zablocki,7° a number of courts, 71 and
67. 434 U.S. at 383.
68. Id. at 386.
69. Id. at 388.
70. "Neither the fact that the appellee's interest is constitutionally protected, nor the fact that
the classification is based on economic status is sufficient to justify a 'level of scrutiny' so strict that a
holding of unconstitutionality is virtually foreordained." Id. at 406 n.10 (Stevens, J., concurring).
See Gunther, supra note 66, at 8 for a description of strict scrutiny as strict in theory but often fatal
in fact.
71. See, e.g., Seoane v. Ortho Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 660 F.2d 146, 149 & n.6 (5th Cir. 1981)
(challenge to constitutionality of legislation mandating review of malpractice claims by medical mal-
practice review boards); DuPlantier v. United States, 606 F.2d 654, 671 n.37 (5th Cir. 1979) (consti-
tutional challenge to Ethics in Government Act of 1978 applying financial disclosure requirements
to federal judges, spouses, and children); Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1172 (5th Cir.
1979) (challenge to legislation mandating mediation prior to filing of medical malpractice claim);
Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1135 & n.32 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (constitutional challenge to Texas
statute proscribing deviate sexual intercourse between individuals of same gender); United States ex
rel. Martin v. Strasburg, 513 F. Supp. 691, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (habeas corpus action concerning
juveniles held in preventive detention); Farrington v. Adjutant General of the State of Michigan, 492
F. Supp. 1362, 1369 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (challenge to residential qualifications for Michigan veter-
ans' bonus); Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n v. Apokedak, 606 P.2d 1255, 1261 & n.25 (Alaska
1980) (appeal by Fisheries Commission from Superior Court reversal of Commission order denying
permit to commercial fisher pursuant to Limited Entry Act); Helvey v. Rednour, 86 111. App. 3d 154,
158, 408 N.E.2d 17, 21 (1980) (challenge to section of Adoption Act giving guardian ad litem of
mentally ill parent authority to consent to adoption of parent's child); Commonwealth ex rel. Platt v.
Platt, 266 Pa. Super. 276, 307-08, 404 A.2d 410, 426 (1979) (Spaeth, J., concurring and dissenting)
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several writers72 interpret Zablocki to mean that strict scrutiny should
apply when the right to marry has been restricted. Justice Powell, 73 and
several courts74 and scholars 75 interpret the case to mean that strict scru-
tiny will apply, but only if the state restriction "significantly interferes"
with the right to marry. A few court decisions76 and commentators
77
(appeal from Common Pleas Court decision affirming certificate for involuntary commitment of
patient into emergency psychiatric treatment); Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87, 91 & n.14 (R.I.
1983) (challenge to legislation creating medical malpractice review boards).
72. See, eg., Developments, supra note 36, at 1192 n.231; Note, 18 J. FAM. L., supra note 65, at
603; Note, supra note 31, at 684; Note, 12 U.C.D. L. REv., supra note 65, at 166 & n.13.
73. "The Court apparently would subject all state regulation which 'directly and substantially'
interferes with the decision to marry in a traditional family setting to 'critical examination'or 'com-
pelling state interest' analysis." 434 U.S. at 396 (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
74. See, eg., Moran v. Beyer, 734 F.2d 1245, 1246 (7th Cir. 1984) (challenge to state inter-
spousal immunity statute used as basis for dismissing former wife's tort claim for intentional injuries
inflicted during marriage); Parsons v. County of Del Norte, 728 F.2d 1234, 1237, cert. denied, 105 S,
Ct. 158 (1984) (challenge to county anti-nepotism rule prohibiting spouses from working as perma-
nent employees in same department); Druker v. Comm'r, 697 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. de-
nied, 103 S. Ct. 2429 (1983) (taxpayer challenge to "marriage penalty" on married taxpayers);
Sturgell v. Creasy, 640 F.2d 843, 853 (6th Cir. 1981) (challenge to decision reducing family's AFDC
grant because father received veteran's nonservice related pension); Martin v. Bergland, 639 F.2d
647, 649 (10th Cir. 1981) (challenge to Department of Agriculture regulation treating husband and
wife as one person for purposes of statute placing limit on amount of farm program supplements
person could receive); Mapes v. United States, 576 F.2d 896, 901 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (challenge to income
tax rates distinguishing between married and unmarried taxpayers); Calhoon v. Heckler, 574 F.
Supp. 1021, 1023 (D. Mass. 1983) (review of Health and Human Services Secretary's decision reduc-
ing divorced wife's Social Security benefits by amount of government pension); Salisbury v. List, 501
F. Supp. 105, 109 (D. Nev. 1980) (challenge to Nevada prison regulation affecting inmate marriage
procedure); Wiesenfeld v. State of New York, 474 F. Supp. 1141, 1150 n.40 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (chal-
lenge to increase in child support obligation); Southwestern Community Action Council, Inc. v.
Community Servs. Admin., 462 F. Supp. 289, 296 (S.D. W. Va. 1978) (challenge to agency regula-
tion prohibiting employment of person in job over which member of person's immediate family
exercises supervisory authority or serves on board or committee with authority over personnel mat-
ters); Vannier v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 3d 163, 171, 650 P.2d 302, 306, 185 Cal. Rptr. 427, 431
(1982) (appeal from decision of Superior Court ordering petitioners to appear as witnesses before
grand jury in Florida); San Francisco v. Superior Court, 125 Cal. App. 3d 879, 885, 178 Cal. Rptr.
435, 439 (1981) (Grodin, J., concurring) (city challenge to Superior Court order of disclosure of
police officer's personnel files); Dawson v. Public Employees' Retirement Ass'n, 664 P.2d 702, 708
(Colo. 1983) (appeal from Retirement Association's denial of annuity from survivors' benefit reserve
fund); Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 653, 458 A.2d 758, 788 (1983)
(challenge to constitutionality of state's scheme of financing public schools); Attorney General v.
Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 310, 385 A.2d 57, 78 (1978) (challenge to constitutionality of medical mal-
practice legislation requiring arbitration of medical malpractice claims before trial).
75. See, eg., Garfield, supra note 65, at 518-19; Karst, supra note 65, at 627-28, 668;
LeFrancois, supra note 36, at 527; Note, 85 W. VA. L. REV., supra note 65, at 360 n.120.
76. See, eg., Joyner v. Dumpson, 533 F. Supp. 233, 241-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd on other
grounds, 712 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1983) (challenge to statute requiring parents to relinquish custody of
their children to state as condition of admission of children to state-financed residential care facility);
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol63/iss4/2
Number 4] RIGHTS TO MARRY AND DIVORCE
cite Zablocki as establishing an intermediate standard of review. Some
do not characterize the standard of review at all, but simply quote the
"sufficiently important state interests" and "closely tailored" language
from Zablocki.78 And, finally, some talk of more than one standard79 or
express uncertainty over what standard the Court applied.8"
A review of the authorities the Zablocki Court referred to supports the
conclusion that the test applied in examining restrictions on marriage
was really strict scrutiny by another name. An examination of Justice
Marshall's own opinions prior and subsequent to Zablocki, however, in-
dicates that the standard applied may not have been intended as strict
scrutiny, but rather as a form of analysis somewhere on the "sliding
scale" between rational basis and strict scrutiny.
In support of the position that "'critical examination' of the state in-
Hawkins v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 584, 599, 586 P.2d 916, 926, 150 Cal. Rptr. 435, 445 (1978)
(Mosk, J., concurring) (petitioners subject to grand jury indictment seeking adversarial preliminary
hearing); State ex rel. Coats v. Johnson, 597 P.2d 328, 331 n.3 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979) (challenge to
statutes relating to detention of juveniles).
77. See, eg., Strickman, Marriage, Divorce and the Constitution, 15 FAM. L.Q. 259, 269 (1982);
Note, Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-A state statute violates the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution when it requires a state resident to obtain
a court's permission to marry if that resident has support obligations to minor issue not in his custody,
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), 56 U. DET. J. U"ta. L. 537, 546 (1979); Note, 12 U.C.D. L.
REv., supra note 65, at 310; Recent Cases, supra note 65, at 337. See also Address of Professor
Anthony Amsterdam, supra note 65, at 616-17.
78. See, e-g., Murillo v. Bambrick, 681 F.2d 898, 902 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1017
(1982) (challenge to special matrimonial fee); Dike v. School Bd. of Orange County, Florida, 650
F.2d 783, 787 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (challenge to school's refusal to allow teacher to breast feed
baby during her duty-free lunch period); Bryan v. Kitamura, 529 F. Supp. 394, 398 n. 12 (D. Hawaii
1982) (motion to dismiss by parents sued for injuries caused by parents' children); Miller v. Morris,
270 Ind. 505, 508, 386 N.E.2d 1203, 1204 (1979) (challenge to Zablocki-type statute refusing mar-
riage license to persons with dependent children unless those persons could prove they contributed
to support of dependent children in compliance with court order).
79. See, eg., Fair Political Practices Comm'n v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 33, 46-47, 599 P.2d
46, 53-54, 157 Cal. Rptr. 855, 862-63 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1049 (1980) (Commission peti-
tion for writ of mandate compelling Superior Court to vacate judgment enjoining enforcement of
Political Reform Act of 1974; court talked of strict scrutiny but later defined strict scrutiny in terms
of "sufficiently important state interests" and "closely tailored" language of Zablock); Bd. of Educ.
v. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 373-74, 390 N.E.2d 813, 818 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980)
(class action seeking declaratory judgment that Ohio system of financing public education violates
Ohio Constitution; court talked of strict scrutiny but later defined strict scrutiny in terms of "suffi-
ciently important state interests" and "closely tailored" language of Zablocki).
80. See, e.g., Browder v. Harmeyer, 453 N.E.2d 301, 305 (Ind. App. 1983) (appeal from award
of adoption to maternal grandparents); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra note 14 at 594
& n.23, 741-42; Hafen, supra note 65, at 509.
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terests advanced in support of the classification is required[,]' the
Zablocki opinion relied upon Massachusetts Board of Retirement v.
Murgias2 and San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.
s3
Both references expressly or by implication equate "critical examination"
with strict scrutiny. In the first passage referred to by the Zablocki
Court, the Murgia Court stated, that "equal protection analysis requires
strict scrutiny of a legislative classification only when the classification
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right ....,84
The Court did not refer to the right to marry as one of the fundamen-
tal rights to be accorded strict judicial scrutiny. It did refer in a footnote
to rights "of a uniquely private nature" including abortion and procrea-
tion, 5 which are, of course, included within the privacy rights to which
the majority in Zablocki equates marriage.86 In the second passage from
Murgia referred to in Zablocki, the Court stated:
Under the circumstances [the Massachusetts statute mandating retire-
ment for uniformed police officers at age 50 was found to implicate neither
a fundamental right nor a suspect classification], it is unnecessary to subject
the State's resolution of competing interests in this case to the degree of
critical examination that our cases under the Equal Protection Clause re-
cently have characterized as "strict judicial scrutiny." 87
The Zablocki Court's citation to Rodriguez refers to a passage in
which the Court did not use the expression "critical examination" but
did discuss strict scrutiny analysis.88 Furthermore, in both the passage
cited and one immediately preceding that reference, the Rodriguez Court
explained that strict scrutiny applies to legislative judgments interfering
with fundamental constitutional rights or suspect classifications.89
In establishing that "[w]hen a statutory classification significantly in-
terferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld
81. 434 U.S. at 383.
82. 427 U.S. 307, 312, 314 (1976), cited in 434 U.S. 383.
83. 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973), cited in 434 U.S. 383.
84. 427 U.S. at 312 (footnotes omitted; emphasis added).
85. Id. at 312 n.3.
86. It is not surprising that the decision to marry has been placed on the same level of
importance as decisions relating to procreation, childbirth, child rearing, and family rela-
tionships .... The woman whom appellee desired to marry had a fundamental right to
seek an abortion of their expected child.... Surely, a decision to marry and raise the child
in a traditional family setting must receive equivalent protection.
434 U.S. at 386.
87. U.S. at 314.
88. 411 U.S. at 17.
89. Id. at 16, 17.
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unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is
closely tailored to effectuate only those interests[,]" 90 the Zablocki Court
cited four cases as examples. 9 ' With only one exception, these cases lend
support to the position that although using words different from tradi-
tional strict scrutiny analysis, the Zablocki Court was, in fact, applying
strict scrutiny to the marriage restriction at issue.
In Carey v. Population Services International,92 discussing state restric-
tions that may be placed upon a woman's decision to procure an abor-
tion, the Court said "'Compelling' is of course the key word; where a
decision as fundamental as that whether to bear or beget a child is in-
volved, regulations imposing a burden on it may be justified only by com-
pelling state interests, and must be narrowly drawn to express only those
interests."93 This passage again reinforces the reference in Zablocki that
marriage is related to the other fundamental privacy rights, procreation,
childbirth, child rearing, family relationships, and abortion.94
The Court in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa Countys" explained that
in evaluating equal protection challenges the Court would determine
"what burden of justification the classification created thereby must
meet, by looking to the nature of the classification and the individual
interests affected." 96 The Zablocki Court later quoted this language in
laying the groundwork for its analysis. 97 In the passage referred to, how-
ever, the Maricopa County Court talks of determining whether the resi-
dency requirement at issue in the case was supported by a compelling
state interest."' As already noted, the Rodriguez99 passage discussed fun-
damental rights in terms of strict scrutiny and equated the phrase "criti-
cal examination" with strict scrutiny." ° Only in Bullock v. Carter' did
the Court refer to "closely scrutiniz[ing]" a state restriction (on voting)
90. 434 U.S. at 388.
91. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l., 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa
County, 415 U.S. 250, 262-63 (1974); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-
17 (1973); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144 (1972).
92. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
93. Id. at 686.
94. 434 U.S. at 386.
95. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
96 Id. at 253.
97. 434 U.S. at 383.
98. 415 U.S. at 262-63.
99. See supra note 88.
100. 411 U.S. at 16-17.
101 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
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while applying an intermediate (less than strict scrutiny/more than ra-
tional basis) analysis." 2
The text of Zablocki strongly indicates, therefore, that although the
Court did not employ traditional strict scrutiny language in evaluating
the marriage restriction, the "sufficiently important state interests" and
"closely tailored to effectuate only those interests" standard represents
merely another way of articulating strict scrutiny. A review of some of
Justice Marshall's opinions in other cases, however, raises doubt as to
what type of scrutiny he intended to apply in marriage restriction cases.
In a series of opinions, Justice Marshall objected to the Court's tradi-
tional two-tiered approach to analyzing equal protection. He argued for
the adoption of a sliding scale approach that would be based upon "the
constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected
and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular
classification is drawn." 103 Justice Marshall asserted that, in fact, the
Court had already moved away from two-tiered equal protection analysis
and had varied the scrutiny given to various classifications." He be-
102. Id. at 144.
103. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 99 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
According to Justice Marshall's dissent in Rodriguez the nature of the inquiry into justification for
discrimination is essentially the same in all equal protection cases: the Court must consider "the
substantiality of the state interests sought to be served" and must "scrutinize the reasonableness of
the means by which the State has sought to advance its interests." 411 U.S. at 124 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Differences in the application of the standard are "a function of the constitutional im-
portance of the interests at stake and the invidiousness of the particular classification." Id. (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting). In effect, the closer an interest comes to being fundamental, the greater
scrutiny it should be accorded. Id. at 102-03 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
In Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, Justice Marshall seemingly continued his rejection of the
traditional two-tiered analysis when he wrote that in an equal protection case, the Court would
determine the burden of the justification that the classification must meet by looking to the nature of
the classification and the individual interests affected, 415 U.S. at 253, the language later quoted in
the majority's opinion in Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383. The Court in Maricopa County then went on to
discuss "compelling state interest." 415 U.S. at 262-63. When contrasting this with the Court's
"sufficiently important state interests" language of Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388, it appears that Justice
Marshall's one equal protection standard theory would make the right in Maricopa County (travel)
more important (more fundamental?) than that in Zablocki.
Justice Marshall again objected to two-tiered equal protection analysis in his dissenting opinion in
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318, 321-22 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing). Finally, in his dissent from denial of certiorari in Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, and
with reference to Zablocki, Justice Marshall objected to the Court's traditional analysis of equal
protection cases and argued for a "more sophisticated" analysis based upon the character of the
classification and the individual interests at stake. 439 U.S. 1052, 1053-54, 1055 (1978) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
104. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 109-10 (Marshall J., dissenting).
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lieved, however, that because the Court outwardly adhered to the two-
tiered approach, it had "apparently lost interest in recognizing further
'fundamental' rights and 'suspect' classes."1 5 Justice Marshall reasoned
that if every restriction of a fundamental right or every suspect classifica-
tion is subject to strict scrutiny, and, therefore, almost sure to be invali-
dated, the Court will be reluctant to recognize "new" fundamental rights
or suspect classifications. 0 6  He stated, however, that many rights or
classifications, perhaps not deserving of strict scrutiny, but too important
to be relegated to rational basis scrutiny, should be analyzed according to
his "sliding scale" approach. 1 7
Justice Marshall's fear that the Court is not interested in recognizing
"new" fundamental rights or suspect classes may support his treatment
of marriage with lesser scrutiny than has traditionally been afforded fun-
damental rights. His assertion in Zablocki, however, that marriage had
the status of a "fundamental" right for many years undermines this argu-
ment.108  Marriage, therefore, would not be a "new" fundamental
right,"° like education, which he offered in Murgia as an example of a
fundamental right that the Court apparently was not interested in recog-
[I]t seems to me inescapably clear that this Court has consistently adjusted the care with
which it will review state discrimination in light of the constitutional significance of the
interests affected and the invidiousness of the particular classification. In the context of
economic interests, we find that discriminatory state action is almost always sustained, for
such interests are generally far removed from constitutional guarantees. But the situation
differs markedly when discrimination against important individual interests with constitu-
tional implications and against particularly disadvantaged or powerless classes is involved.
The majority suggests, however, that a variable standard of review would give this Court
the appearance of a "superlegislature.". . . I cannot agree. Such an approach seems to me
a part of the guarantees of our Constitution and of the historic experiences with oppression
of and discrimination against discrete, powerless minorities which underlie that document.
Id. at 109 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
In his dissenting opinion in Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, Justice Marshall repeated
his assertion that, in fact, the Court does not really follow the two-tiered equal protection analysis it
claims to employ. 427 U.S. at 318-21 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Rather, Justice Marshall stated, the
Court "focused [rightly, in his view] upon the character of the classification in question, the relative
importance to individuals in the class discriminated against of the governmental benefits that they do
not receive, and the state interests asserted in support of the classification." Id. at 318 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
105. Id. at 318-19 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 319 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 319-20 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
108. 434 U.S. at 383-85. The precedents Justice Marshall cited in support of this assertion dated
back to 1888. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888). 434 U.S. at 384.
109. But see supra notes 13-64 and accompanying text, arguing that, in fact, the Supreme Court
did not fully recognized marriage as a fundamental right until its decision in Zablocki.
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nizing. 11° Furthermore, the Court on its own has explicitly recognized
an intermediate level of scrutiny applicable in equal protection cases."'t
The Court has not, however, applied the intermediate standard to funda-
mental fights cases.112
A final indication that Justice Marshall intended the Zablocki test to
be something other than traditional strict scrutiny was his dissent from
denial of certiorari in Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library,"3 In Ht0-
lenbaugh, Justice Marshall again objected to the Court's traditional anal-
ysis of equal protection cases and argued for a "more sophisticated"
analysis based upon the character of the classification and the individual
interests at stake in the case.'
1 4
Despite Justice Marshall's description of the Zablocki standard and
despite his preference for a "sliding scale" rather than a rigid two-tiered
equal protection approach, other factors indicate that he may have in-
tended the Court to apply strict scrutiny to marriage restrictions.
In his dissenting opinion in Rodriguez, Justice Marshall indicated that
there might not be any difference in state interests characterized vari-
ously as "compelling," "substantial," or "important.""' 5  Similarly, in
his dissenting opinion in Sosna v. Iowa, Justice Marshall stated that he
would scrutinize the Iowa divorce residency requirement to determine if
it constituted a reasonable means of furthering an important state inter-
est, a standard that he equated with the compelling state interest stan-
dard." 6 In his dissenting opinion in United States v. Kras, Justice
Marshall objected to what he viewed as the majority's characterization of
divorce as a constitutionally protected interest and, therefore, as subject
to a compelling state interest analysis. 1 ' 7 Finally, and perhaps most sig-
nificantly, Justice Marshall in his dissenting opinion in Mobile v.
110. 427 U.S. at 318-19 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
111. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (to be valid, a gender-based classification must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of
those objectives).
112. Developments, supra note 36, at 1195 n.252. This same source views the concurring opin-
ions of Justice Powell and Justice Stevens in Zablocki as a first endorsement by a member of the
Court for the use of intermediate scrutiny when dealing with a fundamental right/equal protection
issue. Id. at 1192 n.231.
113. 439 U.S. 1052, 1055 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
114. Id. at 1053-54 (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
115. 411 U.S. at 124-25 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
116. 419 U.S. 393, 420 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
117. 409 U.S. 434, 462 n.4 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Bolden "18 stated that "[u]nder the Equal Protection Clause, if a classifi-
cation 'impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly pro-
tected by the Constitution, . . . strict judicial scrutiny' is required...
regardless of whether the infringement was intentional."119 In a footnote
to that passage, he cited Zablocki and Loving to support the proposition
that "Under the rubric of the fundamental right of privacy, we have rec-
ognized that individuals have freedom from unjustified governmental in-
terference with personal decisions involving marriage ....""0
It is impossible to determine with absolute certainty what level of scru-
tiny the Zablocki majority intended to apply to restrictions on marriage.
The Court, however, has given no indication that it intends to soften the
strict scrutiny analysis traditionally applied in the fundamental rights
area. Furthermore, application of strict scrutiny to marriage restriction
cases would not be inconsistent with Justice Marshall's approach to
equal protection analysis, or with his treatment of fundamental rights in
general or the fundamental right to marry in particular. Although it is
still possible to argue that some form of intermediate scrutiny is applica-
ble to marriage restriction cases, the better argument is that, until the
Supreme Court expressly declares otherwise, marriage is a fundamental
right and is entitled to strict scrutiny protection. It is also arguable that
none of these analytical problems would have presented themselves had
Zablocki been approached from a due process, rather than an equal pro-
tection, perspective.
B. The More Appropriate Test?
Justice Stewart, concurring in Zablocki, rejected the majority's equal
protection approach to the case, arguing instead for a substantive due
process approach.12 "The Equal Protection Clause," he wrote, "deals
not with substantive rights or freedoms but with invidiously discrimina-
tory classifications.... The problem in this case is not one of discrimina-
tory classifications, but of an unwarranted encroachment upon a
constitutionally protected freedom." '22
118. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
119. Id. at 55, 113 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17).
120. Id. at 113-14 n.9 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
121. 434 U.S. at 391-96 (Stewart, J., concurring).
122. Id. at 391-92 (Stewart, J., concurring). A number of courts have also interpreted Zablocki
as a due process rather than as an equal protection case. See, e.g., Joyner v. Dumpson, 712 F.2d 770,
777 (2d Cir. 1983); Moe v. Dinkins, 669 F.2d 67, 68 (2d Cir. 1982); Petrey v. Flaugher, 505 F. Supp.
1087, 1090 & n.15 (E.D. Ky. 1981); Salisbury v. List, 501 F. Supp. 105, 109 (D. Nev. 1980); South-
Number 4]
Washington University Open Scholarship
598 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 63:577
Why does it matter whether the Court applies an equal protection or a
due process analysis to restrictions on marriage? t2 3 If marriage is a fun-
damental right, any restriction on an individual seeking to exercise the
right should be subjected to strict scrutiny regardless of the approach
used. 124
Characterization of the analysis employed in Zablocki as due process
rather than as equal protection made a difference to Justice Stewart for at
least one theoretical and one more practical reason. Theoretically, he
noted, the issue was not one of discriminatory classification, an equal
protection question, but rather one of infringement of a constitutionally
protected right, a due process question.'25 Practically, he believed that a
due process analysis would allow the Court more flexibility and would
permit it to focus on matters more appropriate to its decision.' 26
western Community Action Council, Inc. v. Community Servs. Admin., 462 F. Supp. 289, 296 (S.D.
W. Va. 1978); Miller v. Morris, 270 Ind. 505, 507, 386 N.E.2d 1203, 1204 (1979). See also Garvey,
Freedom and Choice in Constitutional Law, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1756, 1761 n.22 (1981) ("Although
the Supreme Court considered the right to marry only under the equal protection clause, it seems
likely that it also qualifies as a substantive due process interest."); Howard, The Burger Court: A
Judicial Nonet Plays the Enigma Variations, 43 LAW & CONTMP. PROBs. 7, 19 & n.72 (1980).
123.
Substantive due process and the fundamental rights branch of equal protection provide
two alternative frameworks within which intrusions upon individual liberties can be ana-
lyzed. The Supreme Court has generally treated them as distinct modes of analysis, some-
times suggesting that each may be appropriate on different occasions. But the Court has
done little to illuminate the distinction. Indeed, the Court has shown itself capable of
recasting virtually any intrusion on substantive due process rights as an equal protection
problem.
Developments, supra note 36, at 1193 & n.242 (1980). (Footnotes omitted; citing to Zablocki as an
example of the Court's recasting an "intrusion on substantive due process rights as an equal protec-
tion problem.").
124. Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 603 n.89 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575
F.2d 1119, 1128 n.15 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979); Holman v. Hilton, 542 F.
Supp. 913, 919 n.9 (D.N.J. 1982); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra note 14, at 740; Van
Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV.
1439, 1455-56 (1968); Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 559-64 (1982).
125. 434 U.S. at 391-92 (Stewart, J., concurring).
126. Id. at 395-96 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart explained:
[To embrace the essence of [substantive due process] under the guise of equal protection
serves no purpose but obfuscation. "[C]ouched in slogans and ringing phrases," the
Court's equal protection doctrine shifts the focus of the judicial inquiry away from its
proper concerns, which include "the nature of the individual interest affected, the extent to
which it is affected, the rationality of the connection between legislative means and pur-
pose, the existence of alternative means for effectuating the purpose, and the degree of
confidence we may have that the statute reflects the legislative concern for the purpose that
would legitimately support the means chosen."
To conceal this appropriate inquiry invites mechanical or thoughtless application of mis-
focused doctrine. To bring it into the open forces a healthy and responsible recognition of
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol63/iss4/2
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The standard of review Justice Stewart articulated, however, is strik-
ingly similar to that Justice Marshall advocated.127 The similarity be-
tween Justice Marshall's and Justice Stewart's positions may indicate
that Justice Stewart is proposing for due process analysis the same sliding
scale approach that Justice Marshall has advocated for equal protection
questions. Like Justice Marshall's approach, it overlooks the traditional
strict scrutiny applied by the Supreme Court to cases involving funda-
mental rights. Justice Stewart's position may be consistent with his re-
fusal to accept marriage as a "fundamental" right.12 The position is not
consistent with traditional due process analysis, however, because if the
right to marry is not fundamental, the rational basis approach is the ap-
propriate analysis. Although Justice Stewart never expressly articulated
the standard he used in analyzing the Wisconsin restriction, it fell some-
where between rational basis and strict scrutiny,'2 9 a standard that the
Supreme Court has not yet recognized in due process cases. 130
While on practical grounds Justice Stewart's proposed due process
analysis sounds similar to the Zablocki equal protection approach, his
theoretical concern relating to due process and equal protection is
distinct.
the nature and purpose of the extreme power we wield when, in invalidating a state law in
the name of the Constitution, we invalidate pro tanto the process of representative democ-
racy in one of the sovereign States of the Union.
Id. (quoting Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 at 600 (Harlan, J., concurring in result)).
127. Justice Marshall stated that "under the Equal Protection Clause, 'we must first determine
what burden of justification the classification created thereby must meet, by looking to the nature of
the classification and the individual interests affected.'" lId at 383 (quoting Memorial Hosp. v.
Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 253 (1974)).
128. Id. at 392 (Stewart, J., concurring).
129. See id. at 393-95 (Stewart, J., concurring).
130. But see Developments, supra note 36. Although both equal protection and substantive due
process strict scrutiny analyses require a balancing test,
the Court has characterized equal protection as involving a "rigid tier" system rather than
the "flexible balancing" afforded under substantive due process.
The nature of the scrutiny applied in substantive due process cases is theoretically differ-
ent, despite the Court's tendency to use language similar to that found in equal protection
cases ...
In due process analysis no threshold marks the passage from the most minimal to the
most exacting scrutiny. There will be intermediate positions [not to be confused with inter-
mediate equal protection scrutiny] as well.
Id. at 1193-95. (Footnotes omitted). According to the authors, the Court has provided no "sim-
ple formula for determining from the degree of intrusion upon a substantive due process right the
level of state interest required to outweigh that right." Id. at 1196. The key to substantive due
process analysis is "'flexibility.'" Id. The authors believe that "[w]hatever the truth of the maxim
that strict scrutiny is strict in theory but fatal in fact" in equal protection analysis, "it is misleading
in substantive due process analysis." Id. at 1196 (footnotes omitted).
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First, there is simply a difference between a right, a matter of sub-
stance to be protected, and a classification, which differentiates between
persons for one reason or another, albeit sometimes implicating rights. 131
Second, consistency in characterization and analysis should compel eval-
uation of the right to marry on due process grounds. The Court in Lov-
ing, one of the primary cases the Zablocki Court relied upon in declaring
the right to marry to be fundamental, expressly stated that "[The Vir-
ginia] statutes also deprive the Lovings of liberty without due process of
law in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." 132 Other Supreme Court decisions dealing with abortion, 133 pro-
creation, 134 and other family-related matters 35 also described the rights
involved in those cases in due process terms and applied a due process
analysis in evaluating restrictions.
Third, in applying a due process analysis to the alleged infringement of
the fundamental right to marry, the court deals more directly with the
issue than when applying an equal protection analysis. Even if a funda-
mental right will be accorded strict scrutiny pursuant to a due process or
an equal protection approach, why should courts bypass direct due pro-
cess review and attempt to relate the fundamental right to a discrimina-
tory classification in order to invoke equal protection analysis?1 36 That is,
why should courts do indirectly through equal protection what they
could do directly through due process? 137
131. "The identification of a right as 'fundamental' is a substantive decision unrelated to equal
protection or technical standards of review." J. NOWACK, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, supra note 14,
at 593-94. The footnote to this statement reads as follows:
This decision invokes ajudicial determination that the text or structure of the Constitution
evidences the existence of a value that should be taken from the control of the political
branches of government. The decision is one that can be best characterized as a substan-
tive due process decision because it involves judicial protection of a substantive value and a
limitation in the substance of laws or regulations which restrict that value or right.
132. Id. at 593-94 n.21.
133. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
134. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
135. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion).
136. Barrett, Judicial Supervision of Legislative Classifications-A More Modest Role for Equal
Protection 1976 B.Y.U. L. REv. 89, 109.
137. Westen, supra note 124, at 581. Compare Franz v. United Slates, 707 F.2d 582, 603 n.89
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (when a fundamental right is at issue the same result may be reached through a due
process approach or through "a more circuitous route: the 'fundamental rights' branch of equal
protection doctrine" although the difference in practice between the two may be that equal protec-
tion analysis is "more rigid, less sensitive to variations in the degree to which access to or exercise of
the right at stake has been impaired") with Barrett, supra note 136, at 110 (the use of an equal
protection approach "significantly changes the focus of the analysis[,]" possibly resulting in a weak-
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If a court insists on applying an equal protection rather than a due
process analysis when discussing the right to marry, it is confronted with
the need to find a classification. Naturally, whenever a person is denied
the right to marry because of a state restriction, one can be classified
based upon personal characteristics.' 38  And, when the right to marry is
at issue, regardless of what discriminatory classification a litigant may
claim, a court can theoretically invoke a demanding level of scrutiny pur-
suant to an eqaal protection analysis because of the fundamental nature
of the right.
The classifications previously noted, however, are not typical of the
classifications to which courts traditionally accord either strict scrutiny
or an intermediate standard of review. Typically, the courts give in-
creased scrutiny to classifications based upon race, gender, alienage, ille-
gitimacy-statuses based upon an "immutable characteristic determined
solely by the accident of birth"' 39 which their "possessors are powerless
to escape or set aside.'" Although certain of the marriage classifica-
tions discussed may bear some of the indicia of immutability,' and per-
ening of protection normally accorded to constitutional interests). As an example of such a weaken-
ing, Professor Barrett points to the Supreme Court's decision in Sosna in which, using an equal
protection analysis, the Court upheld the divorce residency requirement. Had the Court used an
analysis focusing on whether the residency requirement conflicted with the constitutionally pro-
tected freedom to travel, as Professor Barrett believes it should have, the residency requirement
would have been invalidated. Id at 119-20.
138. Mr. Redhail, one of a group of noncustodial parents unable to comply with a court order of
support for his child, was classified according to wealth. One prohibited from marrying another of
the same gender is classified on the basis of affectional preference. One prohibited from marrying a
close blood relative is in a class different from those desiring to marry a person who is not a close
relative. Persons prohibited from marrying because they are already married are in a class different
from those unmarried persons who desire to marry.
139 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion).
140 Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 360 (1978) (Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring and dissenting).
141 For example, there is no one known or accepted reason to explain why some individuals are
homosexuals. J. GAGNON & W SIMON, SEXUAL CONDUCT: THE SOCIAL SOURCES OF HUMAN
SEXUAt ItY 132-37 (1973); Pomeroy, HOMOSEXUALITY in THE SAME SEX 11-13 (R. Weltge ed.
1969). Persons born into poverty, although theoretically able to overcome it, are frequently "power-
less" to do so. For example, children born to adolescent mothers are disadvantaged because of poor
health and living conditions and the lack of good nutrition and medical care available to their
mothers before the children were born. See, eg., Equal Rights for Infants, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17,
1984, at A24, col. 1-3; Iron Deficiencies in Infants May Have Link to Economy, N.Y. Times, Apr. 30,
1984, at A13, col. 1-2. Once born, children living in poverty do not receive the nourishment, health
carc, housing, or education generally afforded those not living in poverty. Thirty-five percent of all
babies, many of them children born to young mothers with little education and from a poor socio-
economic background, are currently suffering from an iron deficiency. Id. at col. 1. Iron deficiency
in childreu leads to anemia which, in turn, could result in a child's being irritable, anorexic, unable
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sons in all of the categories mentioned may be treated differently from
other individuals not sharing the characteristic in question, they do not
fit the same type of classifications as those classified by race, gender,
alienage, or illegitimacy. Yet, if the courts insist upon applying an equal
protection analysis whenever the right to marry is implicated, the courts
are forced to make classifications out of characteristics traditionally not
regarded as such.
How much less complicated and more direct the analysis would be
were the courts to analyze the right to marry by treating it as a substan-
tive, constitutional right, rather than manufacturing another form of
analysis to which it is only peripherally related.
The right to marry is a fundamental right. Although Justice Marshall
may have intended to invoke less than strict scrutiny in evaluating the
marriage restriction in Zablocki, the case itself, the cases upon which it
relies, and the fact that the Court has not expressly adopted a lesser stan-
dard of scrutiny in analyzing fundamental rights all support the conclu-
sion that whether courts apply an equal protection or a due process
analysis to future marriage restriction cases, the standard should be the
same: does there exist a compelling state interest justifying the imposi-
tion of the restriction and is the restriction the least restrictive means of
achieving the state's purpose?
III. CONTINUING VALIDITY OF RESTRICTIONS UPON MARRIAGE
A. "'Significant Interference" With Decisions To Marry
Whatever the test to be applied to restrictions on marriage, the
Zablocki Court made clear that not "every state regulation which relates
in any way to the incidents of or prerequisites for marriage must be sub-
jected to rigorous scrutiny. To the contrary, reasonable regulations that
do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital rela-
tionship may legitimately be imposed." 42 Although the Court was not
to attend to stimuli for more than short periods of time, and unmotivated. These factors may then
result in impaired learning capacity and poor scholastic performance. Id. at col. 1-2. Accordingly,
these children will not be as strong or as prepared for adulthood as their wealthier counterparts. See
also L. FERMAN, J. KORNBLUH, & A. HABER, POVERTY IN AMERICA xix (1969); M. HARRINOTON,
THE OTHER AMERICA: POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 14-16; 187-88 (1964); POVERTY AS A
PUBLIC ISSUE 4 (B. Seligman ed. 1965). Not all characteristics with which one might be born or
from which one might be unable to escape, however, are deemed immutable. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982) (undocumented alien status not immutable characteristic); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. at 677 (intelligence or physical disability not immutable characteristic).
142. 434 U.S. at 386.
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explicit about what constitutes "reasonable regulations that do not signif-
icantly interfere with decisions" to marry, 143 two references in Zablocki
to Califano v. Jobst " provide some guidance in determining which regu-
lations "significantly interfere," and, therefore, deserve the Court's rigor-
ous scrutiny.
Jobst concerned a Social Security regulation mandating termination of
secondary benefits to a disabled dependent child of a covered wage earner
if the child were to marry an individual not entitled to Social Security
benefits, even if the spouse were also disabled. The Court treated the
case as one involving governmental benefits and economic regulation
rather than the right to marry and held that the regulation was rationally
based upon the assumption that marital status is indicative of children's
independence of their parents.1 45 Therefore, the Court held the regula-
tion did not violate Jobst's rights pursuant to the due process clause of
the fifth amendment.
In Zablocki, the Court first cited Jobst immediately following the lan-
guage "To the contrary, reasonable regulations that do not significantly
interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship may legiti-
mately be imposed."146 The Court, therefore, may have believed that the
Social Security regulation in Jobst did not significantly interfere with
Jobst's decision to marry.
The Zablocki Court then explained in a footnote that the "directness
and substantiality of the interference with the freedom to marry distin-
guish [Zablocki] from Jobst."'147 The Social Security regulation "placed
no direct legal obstacle in the path of persons desiring to get married,"
nor was there "evidence that the laws significantly discouraged, let alone
made 'practically impossible,' any marriages." ' In fact, the regulation
had not deterred Jobst from marrying his wife even though he lost his
benefits when he did so. 14 9
143. See id. at 396 (Powell, J., concurring).
144. 434 U.S. 47 (1977).
145. Id. at 52-54.
146. 434 U.S. at 386.
147. Id. at 387 n.12.
148. Id. (emphasis added).
149. Id. Jobst may have been a different case-perhaps with a different result-had Jobst chal-
lenged the Social Security regulation prior to his marriage. While the case still would have involved
government benefits and economic regulation, Jobst could have asserted that the regulation consti-
tuted an obstacle that not only "significantly discouraged" but "made 'practically impossible'" his
marriage. Had the Court found that to be true and had the Court been ready and willing to adopt
the standard it later formulated in Zablocki. the Social Security regulation affecting Jobst's marriage
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Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stevens, in separate concurring opin-
ions in Zablocki, further distinguished the Court's decision in Jobst. The
Chief Justice wrote that "Unlike the intentional and substantial interfer-
ence with the right to marry effected by the Wisconsin statute at issue
here, the Social Security Act provisions challenged in Jobst did not con-
stitute an 'attempt to interfere with the individual's freedom to make a
decision as important as marriage,' . ..and, at most, had an indirect
impact on that decision." 150 Justice Stevens distinguished Jobst as con-
cerning a classification based upon marital status rather than upon the
right to marry.151 Although conceding that such regulations might
"'significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relation-
ship[,]'" Justice Stevens noted that that type of interference need not
invalidate legislation reflecting differences between married and unmar-
ried persons. 52 A classification based upon marital status, as in Jobst,
Justice Stevens explained, is "fundamentally different" from a classifica-
tion that determines who may enter into a lawful marital relationship,
such as in Loving.153
Juxtaposing Jobst and Zablocki illustrates the difference between "be-
ing married" and "getting married," but does not offer a definitive way to
determine which restrictions upon marriage so significantly interfere
with the decision to marry that they deserve rigorous scrutiny. Not all
restrictions upon marriage fit neatly into categories made obvious by the
Court's language in Zablocki, or into the Jobst "being married" versus
"getting married" dichotomy. Rather, various restrictions upon mar-
riage lie along a spectrum between the extremes established by Zablocki
and Jobst.
At the Zablocki end of the spectrum lie restrictions that permanently
or at least indefinitely preclude individuals from marrying. Those re-
strictions include financial barriers such as the support obligation in
Zablocki or marriage license filing fees, 54 prison regulations prohibiting
might have been stricken. Such an argument raises the further issue, however, of whether the regu-
lation would significantly interfere with Jobst's right to marry. Jobst was not precluded from mar-
rying and retaining his benefits so long as the individual he married was also entitled to Social
Security benefits. For a discussion of whether an individual's right to marry encompasses the right
to marry any person or whether the right may be restricted so long as the individual has available a
reasonable number of prospective spouses, see infra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
150. Id. at 391 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
151. Id. at 403-04 (Stevens, J., concurring).
152. Id. at 403 (Stevens, J., concurring).
153. Id. at 403-04 & n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring).
154. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 26840 (Deering Supp. 1984) ($10.00); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
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certain prisoners from marrying while incarcerated, l55 statutes prohibit-
ing individuals with certain mental disabilities from marrying,1 56 and
medical examination requirements.1 57 Next along the spectrum are re-
strictions that prohibit individuals from marrying at a certain point in
time, but allow the same marriages to occur at a definite future date. An
example of such restrictions are statutes entirely prohibiting marriages
between minors below certain ages and permitting marriages between
"older" minors with parental or judicial consent.1 58 Next on the spec-
53, § 73 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-85) ($40.00); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 2352(2) (Supp. 1983-
84) ($10.00); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 161-10(2) (Supp. 1983) ($15.00); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 1-19
(Purdon 1965) (S3.00).
155. See Bradbury v. Wainwright, 718 F.2d 1538, 1539 (11th Cir. 1983) (Rule 33.3-13 of Florida
Department of Corrections prohibiting marriages of prisoners, inter alia, under sentence of death or
prisoners under sentence of life imprisonment and required to serve no fewer than 25 years before
becoming eligible for parole unless, in latter case, prisoner's release date can be determined to be
within 1 year and prisoner is participating in community release and furlough program); Safley v.
Turner, 586 F. Supp. 589, 592 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (Division of Corrections rule placing burden on
inmate to prove compelling reason why institution should permit inmate to marry while incarcer-
ated); Salisbury v. List, 501 F. Supp. 105, 106-07 (D. Nev. 1980) (Department of Prison's Procedure
Manual, Procedure No. 314, setting forth 5 requirements before prisoner permitted to marry, includ-
ing requirement that prisoner and prospective spouse knew each other for at least 1 year prior to
prisoner's incarceration and that the couple presented a strong, compelling reason to marry); Fitz-
patrick v. Smith, 59 N.Y.2d 916, 466 N.Y.S.2d 318, 453 N.E.2d 547, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 399
(1983) (statute prohibiting marriages by inmates serving sentences of life imprisonment).
156 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4201 (Deering 1984) ("No license shall be granted when either
of the parties ... is an imbecile [or] is insane ... at the time of making the application for the
license"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 32(1) (Supp. 1983-84) ("No person who is impaired by
reason of mental illness or mental retardation to the extent that he lacks sufficient understanding or
capacity to make, communicate or implement responsible decisions concerning his person or prop-
erty is capable of contracting marriage."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-9 (Supp. 1981) (required health
certificate "shall state that, by the usual methods of examination made by a regularly licensed physi-
cian, the applicant was found to be mentally competent"); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48 § 1-5(d) (Purdon
Supp. 1984-85) ("No license to marry shall be issued ... (d) If either of the applicants for a license is
weak-minded, insane, of unsound mind, or is under guardianship as a person of unsound mind
unless a judge of the orphans' court shall decide that it is for the best interest of such applicant and
the general public to issue the license.").
157. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-9 (1981 Supp.); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 1-5(a) (Purdon Supp.
1984-85).
158. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4101 (Deering 1984) (applicants under 18 years of age required to have
consent in writing of parents or guardian and court); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 208 (Smith-Hurd
1980) (individuals between ages 16 and 18 whose parents or guardians are incapable of or unwilling
to consent to marriage may seek court permission; by implication, those younger than 16 may not
marry even with parental permission); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 62 (1964) (marriage license
applicants between ages 16 and 18 must secure written consent from parents or guardian or, if no
such person is available, from court; marriage license applicants younger than 16 must receive writ-
ten permission of parents or guardian and court); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-2(a) & (b) (1976) (appli-
cants between ages 16 and 18 must receive written consent from at least I parent or guardian;
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trum are restrictions that prohibit individuals from marrying certain
other individuals, but that permit the same individuals to marry outside
the restricted class. Examples of these restrictions include prohibitions
against incestuous, 15 9 homosexual, 160 or polygamous161 marriages. Fi-
nally, at the far end of the spectrum are restrictions that place no direct
obstacle in the path of individuals choosing to get married, but that make
the individuals' lives less agreeable or less comfortable once they are mar-
ried. These restrictions include beneficiary provisions such as the one at
issue in Jobst,162 neopotism rules, 163 financial disclosure laws,' 6" and tax
unmarried female older than 12, younger than 18 who is pregnant or has given birth, and father of
child may marry with written consent of the female's parent or guardian or county director of social
services); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 1-5(c) (Purdon Supp. 1984-85) (applicants younger than 18 must
have consent of parent or guardian given in person or by certified, attested, acknowledged docu-
ment) & § 1-5(b) (1965) (applicants under age 16 need permission of court). The Uniform Marriage
and Divorce Act sets 18 as the minimum age for marriage without consent of parents, guardian, or
court and 16 as the minimum age for marriage with consent of parents or guardian and court. UNIF,
MARRIAGE & DIVORCE Acr § 203(l), 9A U.L.A. 102-03 (1979).
159. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 212(2)-(4) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-85) (ances-
tor/descendant, siblings, by whole or halfblood or adoption; uncle/niece, aunt/nephew, by whole or
half blood; first cousins except when they are 50 years of age or older); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-3
(Supp. 1981) (no two people may marry if "nearer of kin than first cousins, or ... double first
cousins"); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 1-5 (Purdon 1965) (ancestor/descendant, siblings, uncle/niece,
aunt/nephew, first cousins; marriage between certain step relatives and inlaws also prohibited). See
also UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE AcT § 207, 9A U.L.A. 108 (1979) (ancestor/descendant, sib-
lings, whether by half or whole blood or by adoption; uncle/niece, aunt/nephew, whether by half or
whole blood "except as to marriages permitted by the established customs of aboriginal cultures").
160. Rather than prohibiting marriages between two persons of the same gender, state legisla-
tures may define marriage as a relationship between a man and a woman. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 4100 (Deering 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 201 (Smith-Hurd 1980). Accord UNIF. MAR-
RIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 201, 9A U.L.A. 100 (1979). Even in those jurisdictions that do not legis-
latively define marriage as a relationship between individuals of opposite gender, the courts so
interpret state marriage law. See, eg., Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973).
161. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4101(a) (Deering 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40 § 212(a) (Smith-
Hurd 1984-85); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-2(a) (1976).
162. See also Gray Panthers v. Adm'r., 566 F. Supp. 889 (D.D.C. 1983) (Medicaid regulation
permitting state to "deem" income from noninstitutionalized spouse to be available to institutional-
ized spouse in determining eligibility for Medicaid benefits is indirect interference with marriage).
163. See Parsons v. County of Del Norte, 728 F.2d 1234 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 158
(1984) (challenge to county's antinepotism rule prohibiting spouses from working as permanent em-
ployees in same department); Cutts v. Fowler, 692 F.2d 138 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (career civil servant's
challenge to antinepotism policy applied when employee's husband appointed head of her division
resulting in her reassignment); Southwestern Community Action Council, Inc. v. Community Servs.
Admin., 462 F. Supp. 289 (S.D. W. Va. 1978) (challenge to agency regulation prohibiting employ-
ment of person in position over which member of person's immediate family exercises supervisory
authority or serves on board or committee with authority over personnel matters).
164. See Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1978) (five state senators challenged state
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Those restrictions which resemble the Zablocki-type restrictions ap-
pear either to present a direct legal obstacle to marriage or to make
"practically impossible" any marriages, thereby requiring courts to de-
termine if the restrictions are supported by sufficiently important state
interests and are closely tailored to effectuate only those interests. 166 On
the other hand, Jobst-type restrictions challenged subsequent to marriage
will not be accorded rigorous scrutiny. Such restrictions tend to deal
with government benefits or personnel administration matters, issues to
which the courts have traditionally applied rational basis scrutiny and
have paid great deference to the states.
167
But what of those restrictions in the middle of the spectrum?168 Age
limitations on marriage may be said to be merely a "delay" of the exer-
cise of the right to marry and that on any given day individuals know the
date upon which they may exercise that right without the permission of
any other person. To state that the restriction is a mere delay, however,
is to overlook what might occur during that delay that could affect the
lives of those who would choose to marry. Children could be born, indi-
financial disclosure law, FLA. CONST. ART. II, § 8, alleging disclosure would implicate familial fi-
nancial affairs).
165. See Druker v. Commissioner, 697 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2429
(1983) (challenge to 26 U.S.C. § l(a) & (c) (1954) (applying different tax rates to married and un-
married taxpayers); Mapes v. United States, 576 F.2d 896 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (same).
166. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388.
167. See supra notes 162-65 and cases cited therein.
168. One might ask why anyone would want to enter into a marriage relationship with a minor,
one of the same gender, a close relative, or one who is already married and is planning to stay
married to the current spouse? It seems likely that persons prevented from marrying by restrictions
based on age, affectional preference, relationship, or marital status want to marry for any and all of
the reasons that adult, heterosexual, nonrelated, unmarried individuals choose to marry. Many (one
would hope most or all) are in love. Many choose to marry for social or religious reasons-to have
the "blessing" of family and church, to have children deemed "legitimate" in the eyes of the law and
society, to join together two families, to end loneliness in a socially acceptable and "moral" manner,
or to increase the chances of living longer. (Married persons, especially married men, have lower
death rates than comparable unmarried persons. H. CARTER & P. GLICK, MARRIAGE AND DI-
VORCE: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STUDY 338-42 (1970)). Some choose to marry for economic
reasons--employers may fire or may refuse to hire individuals cohabiting with someone of the oppo-
site sex to whom he or she is not married; marriage may affect tax rates; spouses are often automatic
beneficiaries of life insurance policies, pensions, or government payments; certain insurance premi-
ums may be lower for marrieds than for unmarrieds; married persons may fare better than unmar-
ried persons financially should their relationships end; married persons are protected by estate tax
laws whether their spouses die with or without a will. Some may marry for reasons of emotional
support, for example to be with an ill partner hospitalized in an institution admitting only visitors
-related to" the patient.
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viduals could undergo severe economic hardship, or would-be spouses
may die, all with much different consequences than if the individuals had
been married.
Although all of this may seem to argue in favor of evaluating age re-
strictions with the most exacting scrutiny, the fact that those restricted
are minors changes the complexion of the analysis. While recognizing
that minors are endowed with constitutional rights, 69 the Supreme
Court has traditionally examined those rights with lesser scrutiny than
when adults are involved.17° Because minors are viewed as vulnerable
and as possessing less well-developed decision-making ability, because
parents are also endowed with constitutional rights concerning child-
raising, and because the courts traditionally have paid deference to the
state in matters concerning children, 7' the Supreme Court is unlikely to
apply the strict test enunciated in Zablocki to a restriction infringing
upon a minor's right to marry. Rather, the Court more likely would
apply a test similar to the one announced in Planned Parenthood of Cen-
tral Missouri v. Danforth 72 and reaffirmed in Carey v. Population Serv-
ices International.7 ' That is, the Court would not ask whether the
restriction served a compelling state interest, but rather whether it served
a significant state interest.174
Restrictions relating to homosexuality, incest, and polygamy raise a
different issue. Without doubt, these restrictions "directly and substan-
tially" interfere with the decision to marry; they place "direct legal obsta-
cle[s] in the path of persons desiring to get married[;]" and they make
actually-not just "practically"-impossible some marriages. But, these
restrictions do not prohibit or make illegal or impossible all marriages.
They restrict a woman from marrying another woman, even though the
other woman may be her choice for a lifetime partner. They prohibit, in
most instances, an uncle and a niece from marrying even though those
individuals want to marry each other and no one else. And, they pro-
hibit one man already married from marrying again as long as he is still
169. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633 (1979); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678,
692 (1977); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
170. See, eg., Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634; Carey, 431 U.S. at 693 & n.15; Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74-
75; Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640-41 (1968).
171. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634; Carey, 431 U.S. at 693 n.15; Danforth, 428 U.S. at 102 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring and dissenting); Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 63940.
172. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
173. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
174. 431 U.S. at 693; 428 U.S. at 75.
[Vol. 63:577
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol63/iss4/2
RIGHTS TO MARRY AND DIVORCE
married even though his present wife and his prospective wife have no
objections to the arrangement. But, the woman may marry any man
(provided he is an unmarried adult not closely related to her), and the
uncle and niece may marry anyone not closely related to them (provided
their intended spouses are unmarried adults of the opposite gender), and
the married man, once divorced or widowed, may marry anyone he
chooses (so long as his chosen partner is an unmarried adult woman not
closely related to him).
Given these conditions, should these restrictions be subjected to rigor-
ous crutiny pursuant to Zablocki or are they examples of "reasonable
regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into
the marital relationship [that] may legitimately be imposed?"' 7 5 Is it
enough that persons are left with a reasonable number of prospective
spouses from which to choose, as in cases involving trusts and wills
prohibiting potential beneficiaries from marrying members of certain reli-
gious or ethnic groups, 17 6 or does the fundamental right to marry mean
that an individual has the right to marry anyone?"' 77 If Zablocki is to be
applied literally, the constitutionally protected right of privacy should
ensure all persons the right to marry whomever they choose or to have
the restriction prohibiting them from doing so judged with strict
scrutiny.
Following Zablocki then, can restrictions on marriage relating to mar-
riage license fees, mental disability, medical examinations, age, affec-
tional preference, incest, or marital status withstand the rigorous
scrutiny prescribed by the Court? 7 '
175. 434 U.S. at 386.
176. See, e.g.. United States Nat'l Bank of Portland v. Snodgrass, 202 Or. 530, 275 P.2d 860
(1954).
177. Shortly after the Supreme Court decided Loving v. Virginia, Father Drinan wrote that
'The freedom to marry cannot in modem society be successfully separated from the freedom to
marry the person of one's choice. For modern man, freedom to marry must be synonymous with the
right to marry the person one chooses." Drinan, The Loving Decision and the Freedom to Marry, 29
OHIO ST. L.J. 358, 364-65 (1968). Following Loving, Father Drinan would have required the courts
to determine whether the marriage restriction had a rational objective and whether the state had a
legitimate interest in the area restricted, id. at 369, a standard substantially more deferential to the
state than that later articulated in Zablocki.
178. Discussion of Jobst-type restrictions (tax laws, nepotism rules, financial disclosure laws) is
omitted because those restrictions, at least if not raised until after marriage, apparently do not war-
rant the rigorous scrutiny Zablocki demands, but rather will be upheld if they serve legitimate state
interests and a rational relationship exists between the restriction and the interest sought to be
served Even if raised prior to marriage, such laws or regulations might not rise to the level of a
significant interference with the decision to enter into the marital relationship. There might occa-
Number 4]
Washington University Open Scholarship
610 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
B. The Standard Applied
L Financial Restrictions
In Zablocki the Supreme Court determined that even if the state inter-
ests sought to be advanced by the restriction on marriage-an opportu-
nity to counsel marriage license applicants on the importance of fulfilling
their support obligations and protection of out-of-custody children-
were "sufficiently important," the restriction was not "closely tailored to
effectuate only those interests." 179 There was no evidence that any coun-
seling ever occurred. Even if counseling had occurred, once it was com-
pleted the state no longer had a basis to withhold the marriage license
from the applicant. Furthermore, while the statute prevented noncus-
todial parents disobeying court orders of support from marrying, it pro-
vided no additional support to the children. Finally, the state had several
other means for enforcing court orders of support-wage assignments,
civil contempt, criminal penalties-none of which infringed upon the
fundamental right to marry.'8 0
The Court also noted that the restriction was both over and underin-
clusive. The restriction was overinclusive because among those it pre-
vented from remarrying because of support obligations owed to minor
children may well have been parents who would have married employed
and/or wealthy spouses who could have assisted the parent in meeting
the support obligation. The restriction was underinclusive because while
it prevented the license applicant from assuming another financial bur-
den to a spouse and legitimate children, it did not prohibit the applicant
from assuming other debts, and it did not prevent the applicant from
acquiring a burden to children born out of wedlock, as happened to
Redhail.' 8 l
sionally exist two individuals who could not marry, for example, because one would lose employ-
ment due to a nepotism rule. Most of these restrictions, however, place added burdens on couples
who marry or make the couples' lives less comfortable after marriage, but they do not preclude
marriage-actually or practically-as do wealth restrictions, time limits, or moral restraints. The
Social Security regulation at issue in Jobst, if challenged prior to marriage, is distinguishable from
tax laws, nepotism rules, and financial disclosure laws. Were one to assert that marriage would be
made practically impossible due to a significant loss of income occasioned by the application of the
regulation, the challenge would more nearly resemble a wealth-type restriction rather than a regula-
tion that burdens an individual once married but that does not preclude marriage.
179. 434 U.S. at 388. The Court also noted that the statute might prevent the noncustodial
parent from incurring more support obligations to later-born children, drawing funds away from
those children covered by the court order of support. Id. at 390.
180. Id. at 388-90.
181. Id. at 390.
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For all of these reasons, the financial restriction on marriage posed by
Zablocki failed to meet the "closely tailored" prong of the Court's scru-
tiny and, therefore, was held unconstitutional. Any similar legislation,
assuming that it also failed to meet the state's interests in the most nar-
rowly tailored manner, would likewise fail.182
Marriage license fees present another form of financial restriction on
the decision to enter into the marital relationship. Even though license
fees may be quite modest, 18 3 the truly indigent may not be able to afford
them, thereby being denied the opportunity to marry for an indefinite
period of time, if not permanently.
The primary purpose behind license fees is payment of the administra-
tive costs of the state's regulation of marriage.184 While that reason is
undoubtedly a legitimate state purpose, whether it is a "sufficiently im-
portant" state interest is questionable. Administrative convenience is not
a sufficient reason to infringe upon a fundamental right. 185 Some may
argue that state-sanctioned license fees are required for any number of
activities, such as driving a motor vehicle or hunting, and that the state is
not required to waive these fees for indigent applicants. These activities,
however, have not been declared to be fundamental rights, as has mar-
riage. As with divorce, the state holds a monopoly on the exercise of that
right. In those states not recognizing common law marriage, 18 6 the only
way in which a marriage may be accorded state recognition is if those
individuals choosing to marry follow state procedure, including payment
of a license fee. By analogy to Boddie v. Connecticut,1 87 therefore, mar-
182. See, eg., Miller v. Morris, 270 Ind. 505, 386 N.E.2d 1203 (1979).
183. See supra note 154.
184. E.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 26840 (Deering Supp. 1984) ($1.00 of the fee to be paid to
county recorder, $1.00 to county clerk, $1.00 to State Registrar of Vital Statistics, and $7.00 to the
County Property Tax Reduction Fund); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 1-19 (Purdon 1965) ($2.50 of the
fee to be paid for the use of the clerk of the orphans' court of the county where license issued and
$.50 for use of the state). But see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 53, § 73 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-85) ($25.00
of $40.00 fee to be paid to Domestic Violence Shelter and Service Fund). While the prevention and
alleviation of domestic violence may well be an interest sufficiently important to justify imposition of
a marriage license fee, the fee is not closely tailored to effectuate only that purpose (only 60% of the
$40.00 fee is earmarked for the Fund.) There also exist means of supporting a Domestic Violence
Fund less intrusive than infringing upon the rights of indigents to marry.
185. See, eg., Carey, 431 U.S. 678, 691 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976); Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
186. Only 14 jurisdictions still recognize common law marriage. J. AREEN, FAMILY LAW 61
n.l (2d ed. 1985).
187. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
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riage license fees that prevent indigent applicants from marrying should
be held to violate the applicants' fundamental right to marry.
2. Protective Restrictions
Some state restrictions on marriage, such as those requiring medical
examinations before a license is issued or those preventing marriage by
minors, certain prisoners, or those deemed to be mentally incompetent,
are justified on the basis of protecting the marriage partners, the part-
ners' potential family, or society in general. In all instances, the restric-
tions may serve sufficiently important state interests. Likewise in all
instances, however, questions arise concerning the closeness of the tailor-
ing between the restriction and the state's objective.
Almost all states require marriage license applicants to submit to a
blood test or other type of medical examination before a marriage license
will be issued. In most instances, the purpose behind the test is to ensure
that neither of the marriage partners has an active case of venereal dis-
ease at the time of marriage. Some states also express concern over tu-
berculosis, rubella, and sickle cell anemia."' Protecting the health of the
populace is a sufficiently important state interest, perhaps justifying a
blood test or other medical examination prior to marriage. Problems
arise, however, if one is unwilling or unable to submit to such an exami-
nation for financial, religious or privacy reasons.' 8 9
Although a blood test is effective in detecting venereal disease, the re-
striction is underinclusive. Marriage license blood tests are directed only
at detecting active venereal disease, not other diseases that could affect
not only the applicants' decision to marry, but also their decisions con-
188. E.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 4300 (Deering 1984) (rubella; test is not required when female
applicant is over 50 years of age, has been surgically sterilized, or presents laboratory evidence of
immunity to rubella); IDAHO CODE § 32-412 (1983) (rubella; test not required if applicant is over 45
years old, presents documentation of previous rubella vaccination, or is incapable of bearing chil-
dren); ILL. ANN. STAT. cl. 40, § 204 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-85) (sickle cell anemia; test given to
all persons "if the examining physician determines such a test to be necessary"); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 42-121(2) (Supp. 1983) (rubella; test is not required when female is over 50 years of age, has had
surgical sterilization, or presents laboratory evidence of immunity to rubella); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 13-a (McKinney 1977) (sickle cell anemia; test given "to each applicant for a marriage license who
is not of the Caucasian, Indian or Oriental race"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-9 (Supp. 1981)
(tuberculosis).
189. Some state statutes authorize waiver of blood tests if the applicants object to such tests on
religious grounds and "the public health and welfare will not be injuriously affected thereby[,]" ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 205(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-85), or "if the judge is satisfied ... that an
emergency or other sufficient cause for such action exists and that the public health and welfare will
not be injuriously affected thereby[,J" CAL. CIV. CODE, § 4306 (Deering 1984).
[Vol. 63:577
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol63/iss4/2
Number 4] RIGHTS TO MARRY AND DIVORCE
cerning procreation. 90 For example, a blood test could determine
whether the applicants are carriers of recessive genes that could result in
various genetic disorders in their children. 91 If such a discovery were
made, the couple could be offered genetic counseling and advice concern-
ing procreation and contraception, all directed to meeting the state's in-
terest in a healthy society. 192  The restriction is also underinclusive
because it merely prevents a marriage license applicant with an active
case of venereal disease from securing a marriage license. It does not
prevent the applicant from engaging in sexual intercourse and endanger-
ing others, theoretically the reason behind the restriction.193
State restrictions on marriage based upon an individual's perceived
mental disability194 or age' 91 rest upon concerns for the family and the
individual. States want to ensure that before individuals marry, they are
financially and emotionally able to care for themselves and their fami-
lies.196 The state also has a concern that children of the marriage be born
190. But see supra note 188.
191. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SCREENING AND COUNSELING FOR GENETIC
CONDITIONS 2, 17-20 (1983).
192. See, eg., CAL. CIV. CODE, § 4201.5 (Deering 1984) (mandating that the Department of
Health Services publish a brochure indicating the possibility of genetic defects and diseases and
listing centers available for testing and treating genetic defects and diseases. The act further directs
the Department to make the brochures available to county clerks who are to distribute the brochures
to all marriage license applicants).
193. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act makes optional state-required premarital medical
examinations. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 203(3), 9A U.L.A. 103 (1979). In a comment
following § 203, the Commissioners explained that their decision not to recommend that such exam-
inations or blood tests be required was based on the ineffectiveness of the procedure:
The premarital medical examination requirement serves either to inform the prospective
spouses of health hazards that may have an impact on their marriage, or to warn public
health officials of the presence of venereal disease. For the latter purpose, the statutes have
been proved to be both avoidable and highly inefficient. Moreover, the cursory blood test
which satisfies the requirements of most states provides very little service to the prospective
spouses themselves.
Id. at 103-04 (citations omitted).
194. See supra note 156.
195. See supra note 158.
196. The younger individuals marry, the less education they are likely to have completed, the
less trained they are for employment, and the less likely they are to find a job that will make them
self-supporting. The divorce rate for couples marrying while still adolescents is higher than for any
other age group in the United States population. Wives were younger than age 20 in 38.3% of all
divorces granted in 1981 and husbands were younger than age 20 in 17% of the divorces granted.
U.S. Nat'l Center for Health Statistics, Advance Report of Final Divorce Statistics, 32 MONTHLY
VITAL STATISTICS REPORT at 12 (Jan. 17, 1984). The best statistical predictor of divorce rates in
1960 and 1970 was the proportion of couples married at young ages. Weed, Age at Marriage as a
Factor in State Divorce Rate Differentials, 11 DEMOGRAPHY 361, 362 (Aug. 1974). For both men
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healthy. The latter concern assumes, however, that all persons who
marry have children. Many persons who marry, however, are unable to
choose not to have children.1 97 A mental disability restriction also as-
sumes that the disability is inheritable, a vastly overinclusive assump-
tion.19 Even if the disability is inheritable and even given the state's
compelling interest in the health of its citizenry, that interest does not
necessarily extend beyond promotion of health to prevention of birth. 199
and women, the percentages in the youngest age-at-marriage category were approximately double
the percentages of persons aged 22 to 27 or 28 to 69. That figure holds true, with one exception (men
aged 28 to 69 and married fewer than 10 years), across all categories of years since first marriage. Id.
at 364. Women who marry before age 18 have a much higher probability of divorce no matter how
long their marriages last. Id.
197. Various census reports indicate that the percentage of women expecting to remain childless
ranged from 6%, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, American Families and Living
Arrangements, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SPECIAL STUDIES 2 (Series P-23, No. 104, 1980)
(wives between ages 18 and 34 in 1978), to 11.6%, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
FERTILITY OF AMERICAN WOMEN: JUNE 1982, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS POPULATION
CHARACTERISTICS I (Series P-20, No. 387, Apr. 1984) (all women between the ages of 18 and 34 in
June 1982). These figures indicate a marked increase over census reports showing that in 1967 only
2 to 3% of all wives aged 18 to 34 expected to remain childless. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of
the Census, AMERICAN FAMILIES AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS, CURRENT POPULATION RE-
PORTS, SPECIAL STUDIES 2, Chart 3 (Series P-23, No. 104, 1980).
198. Many reasons are advanced to explain the cause of mental retardation. While some of the
causes are genetically linked, many are not. See HANDBOOK OF MENTAL RETARDATION (J. Matson
& J. Mulick ed. 1983) (see especially Abuelo, Genetic Disorders, at 105-20; Lott, Perinatal Factors in
Mental Retardation, at 97-103; Pueschel & Thuline, Chromosome Disorders, at 121-41); MENTAL
RETARDATION (H. Stevens & R. Heber ed. 1964) (see especially Anderson, Genetics in Mental Retar-
dation, at 348-94); MENTAL DEFICIENCY: THE CHANGING OUTLOOK (A.M. Clarke & A.D.B.
Clarke ed. 1975) (see especially Berg, Aetiological Aspects of Mental Subnormality Pathological Fac-
tors, at 82-107; Clarke & Clarke, The Changing Outlook; at 6-7; Kushlick & Blunden, The Epidemi-
ology of Mental Subnormality, at 49-60). Those individuals who are mentally disabled due to genetic
reasons may or may not pass on the genetic disability to their children depending upon the combina-
tion of dominant/recessive genes related to the disorder carried and transmitted by them and by
their sex partners. Abuelo, Genetic Disorders in HANDBOOK OF MENTAL RETARDATION 107 (J.
Matson & J. Mulick ed. 1983).
199. But see In re Sterilization of Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 221 S.E. 2d 307 (1976) (upheld the
validity of a statute authorizing sterilization of mentally retarded individuals when, inter alia, the
"patient ... would be likely, unless sterilized, to procreate a child or children who would have a
tendency to serious physical, mental, or nervous disease or deficiency. .. ."). See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 35-39(3) (1984). Although involuntary sterilization of those deemed mentally incompetent is still
statutorily authorized in a number of jurisdictions, the reasons advanced for sterilization frequently
refer to the well-being of the person to be sterilized and of potential offspring in terms of having
someone to care for them, as opposed to the "health" or potential genetic disabilities with which the
offspring might be born. See, eg., GA. CODE § 31-20-3(b) (1982) (permits sterilization of "persons
who, because of mental retardation, brain damage, or both, is irreversibly and incurably mentally
incompetent to the degree that such person, with or without economic aid (charitable or otherwise)
from others, could not provide care and support for any children procreated by such person in such
a way that such children could reasonably be expected to survive to the age of 18 years without
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The restriction also ignores those disabled children born to nondisabled
parents. 2° Finally, restricting marriage will not prevent childbirth.
For those who do have children, a marriage restriction based on
mental disability or age is further overinclusive because it assumes that
mentally disabled or minor parents could not care for themselves or their
children, when many can. There are, however, many mentally compe-
tent adults, who are not mentally, emotionally, or financially able to care
for themselves and a family. The state does not and cannot prevent such
marriages from occurring, despite the fact that the result may be no dif-
ferent from the result of marriages between minors or those labeled men-
tally incompetent.
Mental disability and age restrictions are also directed at ensuring that
persons who marry are able to support themselves and their families.
Again, the provision is overinclusive because it includes many persons
classified as mentally disabled or minors who are gainfully employed and
self-supporting. The restriction is underinclusive because it does not ac-
count for the many adults or persons not labeled mentally disabled who
are not gainfully employed or self-supporting, yet who are able to marry.
Preventing minors or those individuals deemed mentally incompetent
from marrying allows the state to withhold its economic and moral ap-
proval from any relationship into which those individuals enter, but does
not prevent the occurrences that the state claims to fear in enacting such
a restriction. 20 1 If the state's concern is promoting the birth of "healthy"
children to parents able to care for them, it would seem far wiser and
more closely tailored to the state's objective to offer minors or mentally
incompetent persons who choose to marry and who are carrying inherit-
suffering or sustaining serious mental or physical harm"); IDAHO CODE § 39-3901(a) (1977) (same,
with additional condition that "free from the obligations of parenthood, [the person] could be re-
leased from the total care within an institution, or remain in a community program and could rea-
sonably benefit from a more independent, normal life"); VA. CODE § 54-325.12(4) (1982) (among
other circumstances, "[t]he nature and extent of the person's mental disability renders the person
permanently incapable of caring for and raising a child").
200. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SCREENING AND COUNSELING FOR GENETIC
CONDITIONS 13 (1983).
201. Many of the concerns of the state, e.g., whether a minor or a person labeled mentally in-
competent would choose to or is able to parent children or whether the individual could financially
support a family, could better be addressed in an individualized hearing rather than by presumption.
Some state statutes provide that despite a marriage license applicant's mental incompetence, a court
may issue a license to the applicant if it is in the applicant's and society's "best interest." See, e.g.,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 1-5(d) (Purdon Supp. 1984-85). See infra notes 210-13 and accompanying
text for a discussion of individualized hearings related to minors who want to marry.
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able traits health care, genetic counseling and family planning services,
and, if warranted, childcare training and assistance. 20 2 Likewise, a better
governmental response in terms of those not trained or employed would
be for the state not to prohibit marriage, but to provide training and
assistance in obtaining employment or incentives to the private sector to
do so.
The state's interest in preventing minors from marrying, at least with-
out parental permission, also relates to traditional protection of the fam-
ily unit. Children are viewed as unable to make decisions as well-
reasoned as adults.2 °3 Furthermore, parents have a right, within broad
limits, to raise their children as they wish, 2 4 and such a right implies the
authority not to have their children override their parents' decisions. Fi-
nally, the state also has a concern with protecting children from abuse or
exploitation, either by parents or others.20 5
Some may argue that because there is no way to determine which indi-
viduals will enter into a successful marriage and which will not and be-
cause the divorce rate among minors who marry is so high,20 6 the better
course is to prevent all minors from marrying without parental permis-
sion; although some good marriages will be prevented, more bad mar-
riages will be prevented.
Three arguments indicate the weakness in that position. First, admin-
istrative convenience or difficulty in making a determination cannot sup-
port a restriction upon a fundamental interest, 207 even when the person
seeking to exercise the interest is a minor. Second, some states waive age
202. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4101 (Deering 1984) requiring court approval of marriages involving
individuals younger than 18 and mandating that the court require the applicants "to participate in
premarital counseling concerning social, economic, and personal responsibilities incident to mar-
riage, if it deems such counseling necessary." In addition, if children born to mentally disabled or
minor parents are not receiving proper care and the parents cannot respond to assistance in caring
for their children, the state may invoke its abuse and neglect procedures to remove the children from
the custody of such parents just as it sometimes does with adult, mentally competent parents.
203. See Bellott, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979); Carey, 431 U.S. 678, 693 n.15 (1977); Danforth, 428
U.S. 52, 103 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting); Ginsberg, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968).
Marriage has long been perceived as a contract to be entered into only by those competent to con-
tract in terms of age and mental capacity.
204. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 637-39; Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 166 (1944); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923).
205. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634-35; Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 640; Prince, 321 U.S. at 166, 169-70.
206. See supra note 196.
207. See Carey, 431 U.S. 678, 691 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
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restrictions on marriage when the female is pregnant.2 °8 If marriages of
minors are at risk, marriages between minors based upon pregnancy are
at greater risk, yet some states sanction such marriages. By doing so, the
state not only is increasing the failure rate of adolescent marriages, but
also is telling adolescents that parental permission may be unnecessary if
they conceive a child."0 Surely, this scheme does not serve the state's
significant interest in stable, well-cared-for families. Finally, when the
state prevents minors from marrying it does not necessarily achieve the
goals it intends. As noted, refusal to marry does not preclude, and may
even encourage, the creation of a family. What the restriction does is
prevent the minors from taking part in a marriage ceremony and from
receiving any public benefits or protections to which married individuals
are entitled.
The state's concern that children will be exploited by adults is an issue
addressed by criminal laws dealing with child abuse or statutory rape.
This is not to say that the marriage of children should be unrestricted.
Most minors do have undeveloped decision-making skills and parents do
have the right to raise their children as they desire. State age restrictions
for marriage, however, could be more flexible and perhaps more success-
ful in achieving the state's purposes. For example, marriage restrictions
could be made analogous to restrictions on abortion.2t ° Children, pre-
sumably adolescents, denied parental permission to marry, would have
the opportunity to prove to a court that they are mature enough to marry
and that they could care for themselves if married.El ' At that point,
child and court could make the decision.212 Judicial review would pro-
vide minors with the ability to care for themselves the opportunity to
208. See, eg., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-2(b) (1984) (still requiring permission for woman to marry
from a parent, guardian, or director of county social services agency, but permitting females older
than 12 to marry if permission secured).
209. Ironically, a minor could terminate her pregnancy without her parents' permission. Dan-
forth, 428 U.S. at 72-75. But see Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643-44 (state may require parental consent
before minor procures abortion if it provides alternative procedure, e.g., a judicial hearing in which
authorization for abortion may be obtained).
210. Note, 12 U.C.D. L. REV., supra note 65, at 301.
211. Similar provisions could be made when one or both individuals seeking to marry are
deemed mentally incompetent. A parent or guardian could grant permission for the parties to marry
or, if the parent or guardian refuses, the parties could seek court permission to marry. See, e.g., PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 1-5(d) (Purdon Supp. 1984-85).
212. Note, 12 U.C.D. L. REV., supra note 65, at 327-30. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 208
(Smith-Hurd 1980) providing for judicial approval of marriages when the applicants are between the
ages of 16 and 18 and are unable to obtain their parents' consent "ifthe court finds that the under-
aged party is capable of assuming the responsibilities of marriage and the marriage will serve his best
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prove that ability and would prohibit those unable to do so from mar-
rying. Automatic waiver of the necessary consent system, should not
occur merely because the couple has conceived a child.213  The parties
would be subject to the same burden of proof as any other individuals,
although the pending birth or present existence of a child would be a
factor for the court to consider in making its decision.
Parents may argue that such an approach undermines their authority
within their family and that the state should not intervene in the ongoing
family relationship. Despite parents' constitutional right to raise chil-
dren as they desire, however, the state commonly intervenes in the family
relationship and instructs parents on how they must, for example, edu-
cate2 14 or care for 2l5 their children.
A system based upon judicial permission would not, of course, be per-
fect. In all probability, some children unable to care for themselves if
married would be permitted to marry and some children able to care for
themselves would be denied the right. Those prevented from marrying
would not necessarily be deterred from cohabiting and procreating. Still,
the individual determination provides greater protection for the adoles-
cents and for the fundamental right to marry than does a blanket
prohibition.
State restrictions preventing certain prison inmates from marrying21 '
also may be justified on grounds of protecting the prisoner's family. Such
restraints may prevent financial dependence upon the state by the non-
prisoner spouse, marital disharmony, instability and dissolution, and ex-
ploitation of nonprisoners. Other state interests that such restrictions
theoretically advance include prison safety and security, improved disci-
pline, rehabilitation, and morale. Finally, prison marriage ceremonies
could cause administrative inconvenience.
A basic flaw with the reasons advanced to support a restriction on
prison marriages is that prison regulations do not require prisoners al-
interest." (emphasis added.) Accord UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 205(b), 9A U.L.A. 105
(1979).
213. See, eg., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 208(b) (Smith-Hurd 1980); UNIF. MARRIAGE & DI-
VORCE AcT § 205(b), 9A U.L.A. 105 (1979).
214. See, eg., Scoma v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 391 F. Supp. 452 (N.D. Ill. 1974); People v.
Turner, 121 Cal. App. 2d 861, 263 P.2d 685 (1953), dismissed sub. nom. Turner v. People, 347 U.S.
972 (1954); In re Franz, 55 A.D.2d 424, 390 N.Y.S.2d 940 (1977).
215. See, eg., Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978) (medical care);
Dumpson v. Daniel M., N.Y.L.J. at 17, col. 7 (Oct. 16, 1974) (punishment amounting to abuse).
216. See supra note 155.
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ready married to divorce once they are incarcerated. The same
problems, however, relating to prison security and discipline and to fa-
milial stability and well-being should exist with married prisoners. In
fact, problems relating to familial stability and support may be even
greater among prisoners married before incarceration because they are
more likely to have children at the time they enter prison than are in-
mates who marry after incarceration.
Prisons must have more effective ways to preserve security and safety
within the prison walls than by prohibiting inmates from marrying. If
the states fear passing of contraband, the prison could tighten visitation
regulations. Contrary to the belief that prisoner morale, discipline, and
rehabilitation would suffer were inmates allowed to marry, they may well
improve if an inmate has a further incentive, a new spouse, for behaving
well and gaining weekend furloughs or early release for good behavior.
In terms of family affairs, the restrictions assume that the nonprisoner
spouses will be dependent upon the state because there will be no one to
support them. The restriction totally overlooks the fact that the spouse
may be self-supporting. The restriction is underinclusive, as well, be-
cause the state has ignored members of the nonprison population who are
financially dependent upon the state, but who may not be denied their
fundamental right to marry on economic grounds. Fears that prison
marriages will be unstable and may even dissolve while the spouses live
separately also support the restriction. Presumably, the nonprisoner
spouse will become tired of waiting for the prisoner spouse to be released
and will look for someone else or the prisoner spouse will at least suspect
that the nonprisoner spouse is doing so. The same scenario, however,
could happen between military or foreign service spouses or any spouses
separated over long periods of time, but surely the state could not pre-
vent such individuals from marrying. Furthermore, the state could en-
hance family stability and harmony through family counseling and
liberal visitation provisions. If the state fears that prisoners will exploit
nonprisoner spouses in terms of property, the state could restrict the pris-
oner's ability to own or inherit property while incarcerated. Again,
means much less restrictive than prohibition of a fundamental right
could satisfy the state's interest.
One court, in addressing the issue of a restriction on marriage affecting
prisoners, explained that because prisoners would be denied the rights to
cohabit, procreate, and raise children with their spouses, a marriage re-
striction denied them nothing more than the right to go through with a
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ceremony.2 7 Such a view completely overlooks the other reasons one
has for marrying.218 The fact that one might not consummate a marriage
or create and raise children while imprisoned is insufficient reason to de-
prive a prisoner of the fundamental right to marry.
3. "Moral" Restrictions
Historically, the Supreme Court has stated that matters relating to
marriage and divorce are almost exclusively within the province of the
states and that the courts should be reluctant to interfere with state re-
strictions affecting family matters.219 Probably nowhere would this argu-
ment be more strongly raised than with those restrictions on marriage
relating to "moral" issues such as homosexuality, incest, and polyg-
amy. 220 But, Justice Powell, concurring in Zablocki, expressed the opin-
ion that "A 'compelling state purpose' inquiry would cast doubt on the
network of restrictions that the States have fashioned to govern marriage
[earlier citing incest, bigamy and homosexuality as among those restric-
tions] and divorce. ' 221 Justice Powell's opinion is accurate.
Restrictions on marriage based upon homosexuality, incest, and polyg-
amy advance related state interests. As with protective restrictions, they
concern the family in particular and society in general. Some of the state
interests may accurately be characterized as sufficiently important. Once
again, however, the fit between restriction and objective sought to be
achieved is weak.
If one of the purposes of marriage is procreation and if procreation is
less likely to occur in a homosexual marriage, states may seek to prohibit
homosexual marriages in order to promote procreation. The state may
also employ restrictions that prohibit homosexuals from marrying 222 to
217. Wool v. Hogan, 505 F. Supp. 928, 932 (D. Vt. 1981); but see Safley v. Turner, 586 F. Supp.
589, 594 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
218. See supra note 168.
219. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975); Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 167 (1899); May-
nard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1878).
220. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 399 (Powell, J., concurring).
221. Id. Justice Stewart, also concurring in the judgment in Zablocki, expressed the opinion that
states "[s]urely... may legitimately say that no one can marry his or her sibling.., or that no one
can marry who has a living husband or wife." Id. at 392 (Stewart, J., concurring). Although Justice
Stewart did not include a ban on homosexual marriages in his list of marriages that the state may
"surely" preclude, that restriction also falls within the category of cases to which he refers. It must
be remembered, however, that Justice Stewart was advocating a "flexible" due process approach as a
guide to evaluating marriage restrictions, not a strict scrutiny, compelling state interest analysis.
222. See supra note 160.
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prevent, or at least not to encourage, what criminal statutes call "deviate
sexual intercourse. ' 223 And the state may think that by preventing ho-
mosexual marriage it will encourage heterosexuality. The state also has
an interest in preventing disease, in this context, venereal disease or ac-
quired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS).
To argue that a restriction on homosexual marriages fosters procrea-
tion overlooks the facts that many homosexuals have had children prior
to entering into the homosexual relationship,2 24 that homosexuals in a
partnership may adopt children22 5 or may choose a partner outside of the
relationship for the sole purpose of having children, 226 and that many
heterosexual married couples are remaining childless. 22 7 Similarly,
preventing homosexual marriage will not prevent the communication of
disease and may in fact work against that goal. Both AIDS and venereal
disease are more common among persons who have many sex partners228
as opposed to those with a single partner in a monogamous relation-
ship.229 Furthermore, lesbians have a very low incidence of venereal dis-
223. See, e.g., MISS CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1972); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.00, 130.38 (Consol.
1975); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3101, 3123, 3124 (Purdon 1983).
224. In one study of homosexual couples, 52% of the homosexual men who had at one time been
married had children and 56% of the homosexual women who had at one time been married had
children. A. BELL & M. WEINBERG, HoMOSEXUALITIEs: A STUDY OF DIVERSITY AMONG MEN
AND WOMEN 391, table 17.13 (1978).
225. But see 1985 Mass. Legis. Sery. 414, 416 (West) (appropriation bill providing that it shall be
the policy of the department of social services to place children in need of foster care exclusively in
the care of persons whose sexual orientation presents no threat to the well-being of the child); MASS.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 110, § 7.103(3)(a) (1985) (foster parent applicants must disclose the name, date of
birth, address, telephone number, sex, sexual preferences/orientation, ethnicity, and occupation).
226. Forty percent of the recipients of sperm donated to the sperm bank of the Feminist Wo-
men's Health Center in Oakland, California, are lesbians, most living in couples. Lesbians' Custody
Battle Poses Novel Issues, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1984, at 37, col. 4.
227. See supra note 197.
228. See Curran, AIDS--Two Years Later. 309 N. ENG. J. MED. 609, 609-10 (1983). Transmis-
sion of communicable diseases will occur in higher rates among individuals with many sex partners
than in individuals who are monogamous regardless of the individuals' affectional preference. There
is some evidence that fear of contracting AIDS has caused a decline in the number of homosexual
men's sex partners, resulting in a decline in other communicable diseases. In a letter to The Lancet,
Franklyn N. Judson, Department of Medicine (Infectious Diseases), University of Colorado Health
Sciences Center and Denver Disease Control Center, reported that between the first three months of
1982 and the same time period in 1983 cases of infection with Neisseria gonorrhea in homosexual
men declined 39%, with no comparable decline in the number of cases among heterosexual men and
women. Judson, Fear of AIDS and Gonorrhea Rates in Homosexual Men, THE LANCET 159, 159
(July 1, 1983).
229. Bell and Weinberg report that homosexual couples in what they call "Close-Coupleds"-
those partners "closely bound together" in a relationship and tending "to look to each other rather
than to outsiders for sexual and interpersonal satisfactions"--exhibit many differences when com-
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ease and AIDS. 2 3' The state could better achieve its goal of disease
control through education and treatment.
Many states have already enacted criminal statutes making "deviate
sexual intercourse" a crime.2 31 If such criminal laws do not already act
as a deterrent to such conduct, a ban on homosexual marriage is unlikely
to deter the conduct.
Finally, no evidence exists to support the belief that banning homosex-
ual marriages will promote heterosexual relationships. Most homosexu-
als prohibited from marrying will simply continue their homosexual
relationship without official state recognition. Homosexuals will not reo-
rient their affectional preference and marry a person of the other gender.
Restrictions that prohibit individuals in certain degrees of relationship
from marrying attempt to address the state's concern with physical and
emotional health and family stability.232 If two persons within a certain
pared to homosexuals not committed to such a relationship. A. BELL & M. WEINBERG, supra note
224, at 219 (1978).
[The Close-Coupleds] were the least likely to seek partners outside their special relation-
ship, had the smallest amount of sexual problems, and were unlikely to regret being homo-
sexual. They tended to spend more evenings at home and less leisure time by themselves,
and the men in this group seldom went to such popular cruising spots as bars or baths....
The Close-Coupleds' superior adjustment is demonstrated in other aspects of their lives.
The men in this group had rarely experienced difficulties related to their sexual orientation
such as being arrested, trouble at work, or assault and robbery. They were less tense or
paranoid and more exuberant than the average respondent. The Close-Coupled lesbians
were the least likely of all the groups ever to have been concerned enough about a personal
problem to have sought professional help for it. Both the men and the women were more
self-accepting and less depressed or lonely than any of the others, and they were the happi-
est of all.
Id. at 219-20. There is, of course, no guarantee that any individual will remain monogamous once
married. Blumstein and Schwartz, in their recent study of various types of couples, found that 26%
of husbands, 21% of wives, 33% of heterosexual male cohabitors, 30% of heterosexual female
cohabitors, 82% of homosexual men, and 28% of homosexual women reported instances of
nonmonogamy since the beginning of the relationship in which they were then involved. P. BLUM-
STEIN & P. SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES 273, figure 47 (1983). With all classes of couples,
percentages of nonmonogamy increase the longer the relationship lasts. Id. at 274, figure 49.
230. Fewer than I% of the lesbians Bell and Weinberg studied reported venereal disease con-
tracted through homosexual contacts. A. BELL & M. WEINBERG, supra note 224, at 119, 336, table
11 (1978). Incidences of AIDS among women have been rare and appear to be related to intrave-
nous drug use or sexual relations with men with AIDS. See Curran, supra note 228, at 609 (1983).
231. See supra note 223. These types of statutes have met with varied results when challenged as
a violation of the individual's constitutional right to privacy. See Baker v. Wade, 774 F.2d 1285 (5th
Cir. 1985) (unconstitutional); Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for City of Richmond, 403 F. Supp.
1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), summary affirmance without opinion, 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (constitutional);
People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
987 (1981) (unconstitutional).
232. See supra note 159.
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degree of consanguinity procreate, the likelihood that their children will
be born with a genetic defect is greater than if two individuals unrelated
to each other procreate.233 Therefore, the state may seek to prevent such
people from marrying in order to protect the health of potential offspring
in particular and society in general. Assuming that the state has an inter-
est in preventing the birth of children who might be born with genetic-
related disabilities, 3 prohibiting marriage between close relatives does
not serve that interest very well.
State concerns relating to the transmission of genetic disorders
through incestuous marriages are inapplicable to blood relatives who are
sterile, past their child-bearing years or not interested in having children.
Even for those individuals who are closely related and who bear a higher
risk of having children with genetically linked disorders, prohibiting
marriage is not the answer to the state's concern. Those individuals may
procreate whether or not they are married. Once again the state's re-
sponse should be genetic and procreative counseling rather than a total
prohibition of marriage.
Although no genetic-related concern exists when referring to individu-
als related by marriage or adoption, concern has been raised over the
stability of the family and the emotional health of children involved. As
Margaret Mead explained, society wants children to grow in a secure and
loving environment. Children should know that they can be cuddled and
loved by older, often adult members of their families and that that love is
innocent and nurturing rather than exploitative.235 If incest restrictions
that concern individuals related by marriage or adoption are removed,
children will not be afforded that protection.2 36 An additional concern
233. The probability that two unrelated individuals will share the same recessive gene is one in
seventy. A. MONTAGU, HUMAN HEREDITY 304 (1959). The probability that biological siblings will
possess the same recessive gene is one in two. Should two siblings possessing that gene procreate, the
probability is one in four that their child will inherit the recessive gene from both parents and in fact
suffer the genetic defect and one in two that the child will be a carrier of the gene. See I. LERNER &
W. LIBBY, HEREDITY EVOLUTION AND SOCIETY 370-73 (1976); M. STRICKBERGER, GENETICS
787-88 (1976). The probability that first cousins share a recessive gene of a common ancestor is one
in eight and the probability that a child born to two first cousins will inherit the recessive gene from
both parents is again one in four. See I. LERNER & W. LIBBY, supra, at 370-73; A. MONTAGU,
supra, at 304; M. STRICKBERGER, supra, at 787-88.
234. See supra note 199 and accompanying text for a discussion of whether the state's concern
with the birth of "healthy" children extends to preventing childbirth as opposed to taking positive
steps to promote health.
235. Mead, Anomalies in American Postdivorce Relationships, in DIVORCE AND AFTER 114-17
(Bohannan ed. 1970).
236. Id. at 117-18.
Number 4)
Washington University Open Scholarship
624 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
relates to the voluntary, knowledgeable decisionmaking necessary to
enter into a marriage. Fear exists that when two people are closely re-
lated, one could exercise undue influence upon or overbear the will of the
other, in effect coercing the marriage rather than having it be a product
of the free will of the parties.
Preventing marriage between individuals related by adoption or mar-
riage, particularly those in stepparent-stepchildren or stepsibling rela-
tionships, will preclude the birth of "legitimate" children and will deny
government benefits and protections to those who would be spouses.237
The restriction, however, will not prevent incest or child abuse or make
children more secure in their homes. Ironically, given the increasing
number of "reconstituted families" containing stepparents and stepchil-
dren,238 many marriage statutes do not prohibit marriage between stepre-
latives. 39 Sexual abuse of children is reaching epidemic proportions240
and in most instances the abuser does not desire to marry the person
being abused. In fact, the abused person is frequently of preschool age,
often even an infant.24 The ineffective response to child sexual abuse, to
date, has been legislation making sexual abuse a crime or a ground for
removal of the child from the home. Part of the answer to protecting
children from sexual abuse by family members related by blood, adop-
tion, or affinity, may be to educate children in terms of what to do if
someone is abusing them, to believe children reporting abusive behavior,
to provide abused children with medical and psychological care, and to
treat and/or prosecute the abuser. The answer, however, does not lie in
237. See Catalano v. Catalano, 148 Ct. 288, 170 A.2d 726 (1961) (incestuous marriage between
uncle and niece voided following uncle/husband's death resulting in niece/wife's being denied Social
Security survivorship benefits and possibly in child's being considered illegitimate). But see ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 212(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-85) (children born or adopted of prohibited
marriages are legitimate); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-3 (Supp. 1981) (prohibited marriage followed by
cohabitation and birth of issue shall not be declared void after death of either party except in case of
bigamy); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 1-16 (Purdon 1965) (marriages within prohibited degrees of
consanguinity or affinity voidable but if not dissolved during lifetime of parties, lawfulness not to be
questioned after death of either party); UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 207(c), 9A U.L.A. 108
(1979) (children born of prohibited marriage legitimate).
238. "One of every eight children living with two parents lives with a natural parent and a
stepparent." U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, American Families and Living Arrange.
ments, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SPECIAL STUDIES I 1 (Series P-23, No. 104, 1980).
239. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40 § 212(2)-(4) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-85); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 51-3, 51-4 (1984); UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 207, 9A U.L.A. 108 (1979).
240. Brozan, A Senator Recounts Her Own Experience as an Abused Child, N.Y. Times, Apr. 27,
1984, at A17, col. 2.
241. Id.
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preventing marriage between relatives. Like statutes making homosexual
conduct a crime, if statutes making incest a crime or a ground for remov-
ing a child from a home do not deter incestuous behavior, a prohibition
on marriage is unlikely to do so.
In terms of knowing, voluntary consent to marriage, coercion or un-
due influence may occur in any relationship, whether or not the two indi-
viduals to be married are related. If they are adults and not within a
prohibited degree of relationship, the law presumes that they are entering
the marriage freely and voluntarily. Relationship, alone, should not be a
sufficient ground to rebut that presumption.
242State restrictions on marriage based upon polygamy, more than
those based upon homosexuality and incest, are directed at providing an
emotionally secure and financially independent environment for the fam-
ily. The state may also be seeking to prevent the exploitation of the
state's resources through multiple marriages.243
The restriction against multiple marriages is underinclusive on familial
and financial stability grounds because there is no similar restriction af-
fecting remarriage or "sequential polygamy. ' ,2 1 One person may marry
and divorce four times, parenting a dozen children, yet not be prohibited
from marrying a fifth time and parenting more children even though the
children live in four different single parent homes and the noncustodial
multiple-marrying parent is indigent and cannot support any of them.24 5
The restriction also does not prevent the individual from cohabitating
with more than one person at a time or from causing the birth of several
children with several different partners. The law will label the children
"illegitimate" and will not provide the cohabitors with any protection or
any benefits, but it will not prevent the children's births or the
cohabition.246
The restriction on polygamy is overinclusive because an individual de-
siring to marry more than one spouse at a time and to have children by
242. See supra note 161.
243. For example, if one is allowed to marry multiple times and dies leaving four spouses, gov-
ernment resources could be taxed without limit in providing benefits to all of the spouses.
244. See J. AREEN, FAMILY LAW 18 (2d ed. 1985).
245. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 375.
246. But see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 212(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-85) (children born or
adopted of prohibited marriages are legitimate). Accord UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT
§ 207(c), 9A U.L.A. 108 (1979).
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one or more spouses247 may not do so even though the person is finan-
cially capable of supporting a large family and is a loving spouse and
parent to all members of the "family." The possibility exists that an
individual marrying a number of spouses may be doing so to exploit the
spouses, particularly in terms of property holdings. The state could alle-
viate the possibility of such an occurrence by requiring the consent of
existing spouses before the spouse may marry again or by limiting the
interest of the multiple married spouse in the other spouses' property. 2
48
The state could similarly limit its own exposure to financial risk by
placing a cap on any benefits it would pay to survivors or dependents, by
providing that all survivors of the same degree of relationship would di-
vide the benefits equally, or by providing that the first spouse would be
entitled to the benefits. Similar to the restriction the Court upheld in
Jobst, that type of restriction probably would be classified as a restriction
not significantly interfering with the decision to enter into the marital
relationship and, therefore, as not appropriate for rigorous scrutiny pur-
suant to Zablocki.
IV. DIVORCE
The Supreme Court has never held divorce to be a fundamental right
entitled to constitutional protection.249 In Boddie, the Court held that
state-required fees that precluded indigent litigants from filing for di-
vorce violated the litigants' procedural due process rights.250 Several
years later, however, the Court refused in Sosna to overturn a statute
imposing a one year residency requirement upon a divorce litigant.25' In
so refusing, the Court declined to apply the strict scrutiny analysis appli-
cable to fundamental rights. 252 Furthermore, the Court noted that the
residency requirement did not foreclose Sosna from ever being awarded a
divorce in Iowa, but only forced her to delay the action until she had
247. This, again, presumes that all who marry desire to or will have children, an overly broad
generalization in itself.
248. It can hardly be denied that certain individuals engage in "sequential polygamy," i.e., mar-
rying and divorcing repeatedly, to take advantage of others.
249. See, eg., Murillo v. Bambrick, 681 F.2d 898, 902-03 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1017
(1982); Cahoon v. Heckler, 574 F. Supp. 1021, 1023 (D. Mass. 1983), affd, 740 F.2d 953 (1st Cir.
1984).
250. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
251. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
252. See id at 404-09.
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253resided there for one year.
Three years after its decision in Sosna, the Court decided Zablocki,
establishing marriage as a fundamental right and articulating a standard
of strict scrutiny applicable to any restriction significantly interfering
with an individual's right to marry.2 54 Two questions remain: Reading
Boddie together with Zablockil has divorce become a fundamental right?
If so, which state restrictions on divorce can withstand strict scrutiny
analysis?
A. The Nature of the Right
One of the sources of the right to divorce is the right to marry. But the
right to divorce, as intertwined as it is with the right to marry, must have
an even more elementary basis. If it does not, individuals may find them-
selves with the right to divorce if they choose to remarry, but not if they
desire to be unmarried. Furthermore, states could argue that the right to
marry is not a continuing right that may be exercised repeatedly, i.e., one
may not divorce only to remarry, but rather that the right to marry is a
fundamental right only until it is once exercised, or in the case of those
unmarried because of the death of a spouse, only when the claimant is
unmarried.255
The answer lies in the idea of association. The Court in Boddie re-
ferred to divorce as "the adjustment of a fundamental human relation-
ship" '256 and the Court in United States v. Kras referred to "associational
interests" surrounding the establishing and dissolving of the marital rela-
tionship.257 Courts and legal scholars argue that the first amendment's
freedom of association was not intended to protect individual, family-like
association. 258 Even so, the right to divorce-the right to be unmarried
(unassociated) or remarried (associated with another)--can still be based
upon the traditional rights of privacy and liberty, and the associational
interests those rights implicate, that repeatedly have served as the basis
253. Id. at 410.
254. 434 U.S. 374.
255. See Murillo v. Bambrick, 681 F.2d 898, 914 (3d Cir.) (Sloviter, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1017 (1982) and Locke v. Locke, 263 N.W.2d 694, 696 (Iowa 1978) for limited references
to a fundamental right to remarry and to "resume singlehood."
256. 401 U.S. at 383.
257. 409 U.S. 434, 444 (1973).
258. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 535-36 (1977) (Stewart, J., dissenting);
Yudof, When Governments Speak- Toward a Theory of Government Expression and the First Amend-
ment, 57 TEx. L. REV. 863, 895 (1979).
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for family-related rights.2 59 The latter is a different type of association,
the association Professor Karst refers to as the "freedom of intimate as-
sociation," the freedom to form and maintain an association, and the
freedom to remain uncommitted.260
The Supreme Court's decision in Boddie261 indicates both that the
right to marry does not attach only to the unmarried (in essence, that
there is a right to remarry) and that a person has a right to be unmarried.
In terms of remarriage, the Boddie Court stated, "Even where all sub-
stantive requirements are concededly met, we know of no instance where
two consenting adults may divorce and mutually liberate themselves
from the constraints of legal obligations that go with marriage, and more
fundamentally the prohibition against remarriage, without invoking the
State's judicial machinery., 262 Both Justice Douglas, concurring in Bod-
die, 263 and Justice Black, dissenting,2" wrote of marriage and divorce as
if they were interrelated rights.26 5 In terms of the right to be unmarried,
the Boddie Court, without specific mention of marriage or remarriage,
repeatedly referred to the litigants' only means of dissolving their mar-
riages2 66 and to an action in divorce as "the exclusive precondition to the
adjustment of a fundamental human relationship. '267
The Court's opinion in Kras268 similarly supports the argument that
divorce is a fundamental right. In Kras, dealing with an indigent's inabil-
ity to file a voluntary bankruptcy petition because he lacked the requisite
filing fees, the Court distinguished Boddie on the basis of the interests
involved. The Court described Boddie as "touch[ing] directly.., on the
259. See, e.g., Carey, 431 U.S. at 684-86; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-56 (1973); Griswold,
381 U.S. at 481-86; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
260. Karst, supra note 65, at 637.
261. 401 U.S. 371.
262. Id. at 376.
263. Id. at 384-85 (Douglas, J., concurring).
264. Id. at 389-90 (Black, J., dissenting).
265. Justice Douglas and Justice Black, while agreeing that marriage and divorce are related or
perhaps even part of the same right, disagreed as to the treatment to be afforded the rights. Justice
Douglas believed that the Court had "put 'flesh'" on the due process clause by concluding that
marriage and its dissolution were so important that indigent litigants should have access to the
courts for divorce without payment of fees. Id. at 384-85. Justice Black believed that both marriage
and divorce were solely within the states' province to regulate, absent any specific constitutional
limitations, which he did not find in the facts ofBoddie. Id. at 389-90.
266. Id. at 377, 381.
267. Id. at 383.
268. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
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marital relationship and on the associational interests that surround the
establishment and dissolution of that relationship." '269 Those are inter-
ests, the Court stated, that "[o]n many occasions we have recognized [to
be of] fundamental importance... under our Constitution."27 ° The in-
ability of the litigants in Boddie to dissolve their marriages "seriously
impaired their freedom to pursue other protected associational activi-
ties[,]" an interest more important than one's right to declare bank-
ruptcy.27 1  In the context of discussing marriage, divorce, and
bankruptcy, the Court concluded that bankruptcy does not involve a
"fundamental interest, '272 implying that marriage and divorce do. Fi-
nally, in concluding its comparison of Boddie and Kras, the Court stated:
Bankruptcy is hardly akin to free speech or marriage or to those other
rights, so many of which are imbedded in the First Amendment, that the
Court has come to regard as fundamental and that demand the lofty re-
quirement of a compelling governmental interest before they may be signifi-
cantly regulated.273
Other Supreme Court Justices, lower courts, and scholars agree and
disagree with the notion of divorce as a fundamental right and with the
interweaving of the right to marry and the right to be remarried or un-
married. On the initial question of whether divorce is a fundamental
right, Justice Stewart, dissenting in Kras, disputed the idea that it was
"any subjective conception of the 'fundamentality' of marriage or di-
vorce" that caused the Court to reach its decision in Boddie.274 Rather,
Justice Stewart wrote, the Court based its decision on the fact that mar-
riage involves "judicially enforced obligations" and that the state monop-
olized the means for individuals to free themselves from those
obligations.275 The same, he indicated, is true for the indigent filing for
bankruptcy.276
Justice Marshall also dissented in Kras:
I am intrigued by the majority's suggestion that, because the granting of
a divorce impinges on "associational interests," the right to a divorce is
constitutionally protected. Are we to require that state divorce laws serve
269. Id. at 444.
270, Id.
271. Id. at 444-45 (emphasis added).
272. Id. at 445.
273. Id. at 446.
274. Id. at 456 n.7 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
275. Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
276. Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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compelling state interests? For example, if a State chooses to allow divorces
only when one party is shown to have committed adultery, must its refusal
to allow them when the parties claim irreconcilable differences be justified
by some compelling state interest?27 7
Although Justice Marshall went on to explain that he raised these ques-
tions to illustrate that he believed the majority's focus on the relative
constitutional importance of divorce and bankruptcy to be misplaced and
that both Boddie and Kras really involved questions of access to the
courts,2 78 the opinion is important in light of his subsequent opinion in
Zablocki.2 9 Zablocki established marriage as a fundamental right and
strict scrutiny as the test to be applied when states infringe on that
right.280 Does Justice Marshall's dissent in Kras indicate that he would
not be inclined to give divorce that much importance in the constitu-
tional scheme of things and would not subject to strict judicial scrutiny
an infringement on the right to divorce?
Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in Kras must be contrasted with
his dissent in Sosna.281 In Sosna, he stated that the first question that the
majority should have addressed was "whether the right to obtain a di-
vorce is of sufficient importance that its denial to recent immigrants con-
stitutes a penalty on interstate travel. '2 2  Justice Marshall concluded
that it did.283 Justice Marshall explained that he would scrutinize the
Iowa residency law to determine if it constituted a reasonable means of
furthering an important state interest, a standard that he equated with
the compelling state interest test.284
Justice Marshall may simply have taken inconsistent positions in Kras
and Sosna and neither may be a helpful guide in determining how the
277. Id at 462 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
278. Id (Marshall, J., dissenting).
279. 434 U.S. 374.
280. Id. at 383-87.
281. 419 U.S. 393, 418 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
282. Id. at 419 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
283. Id. at 419-20 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall stated:
The previous decisions of this Court make it plain that the right of marital association is
one of the most basic rights conferred on the individual by the State. The interests associ-
ated with marriage and divorce have repeatedly been accorded particular deference. In
Boddie v. Connecticut, we recognized that the right to seek dissolution of the marital rela-
tionship was closely related to the right to marry, as both involve the voluntary adjustment
of the same fundamental human relationship. . . . I think it is clear beyond cavil that the
right to seek dissolution of the marital relationship is of such fundamental importance that
denial of this right to the class of recent interstate travelers penalizes interstate travel.
Id. (citations omitted).
284. Id at 420 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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author of Zablocki would decide a case involving a restriction on divorce.
The better argument, however, is that Justice Marshall's dissenting opin-
ion in Sosna is more indicative of his position on the right to divorce.
First, Sosna is more clearly on point because it involved a restriction
upon divorce. Second, in Kras, Justice Marshall was clearly bothered by
what he viewed as the Court's overlooking the significant issue of indi-
gent litigants' access to the courts. Third, Sosna is closer in time to the
decision in Zablocki. Finally, while the dissent in Kras is rather nonspe-
cific and rhetorical in terms of the right to divorce, the dissent in Sosna is
quite specific in speaking of the importance of the rights to marry and
divorce and the deference courts accord such rights.
The Third Circuit in Murillo v. Bambrick,285 challenging New Jersey's
special matrimonial litigation fee, suggested that Boddie, Kras, and
Zablocki could be interpreted consistently without finding in their inter-
weaving a fundamental right to divorce.286 The court explained that
none of the cases explicitly recognized a fundamental right to divorce.
Boddie and Kras were essentially procedural due process cases.
Zablocki, in contrast, recognized a fundamental right to marry, but not a
fundamental right to divorce. And, the restriction at issue in Sosna, de-
cided subsequent to Boddie, was held to a standard of scrutiny far below
that of strict scrutiny.287 The court in Murillo further suggested that the
fundamental right to divorce need not exist for the fundamental right to
marry to be of continuing validity.288 Under Zablocki, the court rea-
soned, if divorce regulations "'significantly'" or " 'directly or substan-
tially' " interfere with the decision to marry, they will be evaluated
pursuant to Zablocki's sufficiently important state interest/closely tai-
lored standard.2 89
While Boddie and Kras were procedural due process cases, Kras made
clear that denial of access to the courts in all matters will not be invali-
dated. Rather, the denial of access in Boddie was considered to be egre-
gious because it affected the ordering of human relationships in terms of
marriage and divorce.2"° The court in Boddie repeatedly discussed the
importance of divorce, relating it to the necessity for dissolving existing
285. 681 F.d 898 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982).
286 Id. at 903 n.9.
287. Id.
288 Id.
289. Id.
290. Kras, 409 U.S. at 443-46.
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marriages. 2 9 1 Although the Court in Sosna gave far less scrutiny to the
divorce restriction than is required when a fundamental right is impli-
cated, the Court failed entirely to address the issue of fundamental
right.292 Furthermore, the fundamental right to marry was not unequivo-
cally established until three years later. Assuming that Sosna was cor-
rectly decided, legitimate reason exists to question whether Sosna is still
good law following the Court's decision in Zablocki.
Finally, to argue that a fundamental right to divorce is unnecessary
because restrictions upon divorce may be scrutinized pursuant to the
Zablocki standard by characterizing divorce regulations as an interfer-
ence with the right to make a decision concerning marriage puts form
over substance. Naturally, a restriction on divorce hinders one who
desires to marry another spouse, indicating that the two rights are closely
connected and that the right to marry gives added support to the right to
divorce. But the right to marry does not subsume the right to divorce.
Arguing that the right to marry is a sufficient basis for courts' rigorous
scrutiny of restrictions upon divorce overlooks those cases in which one
desiring a divorce does not wish to remarry. In that instance, if no right
to divorce exists, the state may impose restrictions on divorce that will be
judged with much less deference than strict scrutiny. That argument
also creates a differentiation in classification between those who desire to
remarry and those who do not, a distinction that probably could not
stand in light of Eisenstadt v. Baird,293 holding invalid a differentiation
between married and unmarried individuals in the distribution and use of
contraceptives.294
Assuming that the right to divorce is fundamental, what standard
should courts apply to state restrictions on divorce? Whether courts use a
due process or an equal protection analysis, 295 fundamental rights are
entitled to strict scrutiny. Because the right to divorce is so closely tied
to the right to marry, the courts should employ the standard set forth in
Zablocki.296 Therefore, if a state restriction significantly interferes with
291. 401 U.S. at 376, 381, 383.
292. 419 U.S. at 419 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
293. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
294. Id.
295. A due process analysis is probably more appropriate for the same reasons that it is the more
appropriate analysis to judge restrictions on marriage. See supra notes 121-41 and accompanying
text.
296. 434 U.S. at 383-88. The Zablocki standard is appropriate provided courts interpret it as the
equivalent of the traditional strict scrutiny analysis.
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one's decision to dissolve the marital relationship, courts must determine
whether sufficiently important state interests support the restriction and
whether the restriction is closely tailored to effectuate only those
interests.29 7
B. The Standard Applied
As with marriage,2 9 8 states impose a variety of restrictions on an indi-
vidual's ability to secure a divorce. The filing fee requirement of Boddie
represents a restriction much like the support obligation restriction in
Zablocki. Although in theory the filing fee requirement makes uncertain
when the indigent litigant will be able to file for divorce, the requirement
in fact poses a permanent restriction on the indigent's ability to be di-
vorced. At the other end of the spectrum, analogous to the "restriction"
on marriage challenged in Jobst, are regulations and laws that, while not
preventing divorce, may make one's life less pleasant or comfortable once
one is divorced. For example, an equitable property distribution law299
may make divorce financially unpleasant for a wealthy spouse. Similarly,
a father's belief that courts give preference to a child's mother when
making custody decisions may make divorce an unattractive option to
him °.3  These laws may cause potential divorce litigants to forego di-
vorce and remain in unhappy marriages because the alternative is not a
positive one, but they neither pose a "direct and substantial" interference
or place a "direct legal obstacle" in the path of those desiring to divorce,
nor do they make divorce "'practically impossible.' "30
Along the spectrum between the two extremes lie restrictions or poten-
tial restrictions that, while not totally precluding an individual's decision
to dissolve a marriage, cause enough delay in the procedure to ask
whether the interference is significant and, if so, whether the restrictions
serve sufficiently important state interests and are closely tailored to ef-
297. Id. at 388.
298. See supra notes 154-65, 179-248 and accompanying text.
299. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-81 (West Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-
11 (Bums Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (Supp. 1983).
300. Professors Freed and Foster note that "the 'tender years' doctrine has lost ground and is
rejected or relegated to a role of'tiebreaker' in most states." Freed & Foster, Family Law in the Fifty
States. An Overview, 17 FAM. L.Q., 365, 416 (1984). There is no question, however, that some
courts still apply the doctrine. See, eg., Brown v. Brown, 409 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982); Albright v. Albright, 437 So.2d 1003 (Miss. 1983); Leisge v. Leisge, 223 Va. 688, 292 S.E.2d
352 (1982).
301. Zablocki, 434 U.S. 374, 387 & n.12.
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fectuate only those interests. The prime example of such a restriction is
the residency requirement in Sosna.3 °2 Other examples include a domi-
ciliary requirement 30 3 or a requirement that married individuals with mi-
nor children not divorce until all children have reached the age of
majority.3 4 A final example of such a restriction may be found in statu-
tory grounds for divorce. With the adoption of some form of no-fault
divorce in all the states except South Dakota, restrictions imposed by
specific statutory grounds are no longer extremely important. 305  How-
ever, some jurisdictions require spouses to live "separate and apart" for
prescribed periods of time before they may file for divorce on a no-fault
basis and the phrase "separate and apart" is interpreted differently
among the jurisdictions.0 6
302. Current residency requirements vary from six weeks, eg., NEv. REV. STAT. § 125.020
(1983), to one year, eg., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-44 (West Supp. 1984); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 42-349 (1984); W. VA. CODE § 48-2-7 (1980). At least two states, Alaska and Washington, have
no residency requirement; three others, Maryland, Oregon, and South Dakota, require residency
only under certain circumstances. Freed & Foster, supra note 300, at 377.
303. The basis for full faith and credit being given to one state's divorce decree by other states is
the fact that the divorce-seeking party was domiciled in the state where the divorce was granted. See
Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287,
297 (1942). See also Garfield, supra note 65.
304. Although this requirement is not currently imposed in any jurisdiction, it has been pro-
posed as a potential restriction on divorce. See Younger, Marital Regimes: A Story of Compromise
and Demoralization, Together with Criticism and Suggestions for Reform, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 45
(1981).
305. Such was not always the case. For example, until 1967, the only basis for divorce in New
York was adultery. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 (McKinney Supp. 1976-77) (law changed to in-
clude other grounds, N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW§ 170 (McKinney 1977)).
306. See, eg., In re Marriage of Uhls, 549 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (statute requiring
that parties live "separate and apart ... for a continuous period ... preceding the filing of the
petition[,]" Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.320, 2(1)(d) & (e) (Vernon Supp. 1984), does not apply to deny
divorce to parties who lived in same house during separation period); Ellam v. Ellam, 132 N.J.
Super. 358, 333 A.2d 577 (1975) (statute requiring parties to live "separate and apart in different
habitations[,]" N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-2(d) (West Supp. 1984-85) does not permit divorce to
parties who still give appearance to community of being husband and wife, even though actually
sleeping in different residences); DeRienzo v. DeRienzo, 119 N.J. Super. 192, 290 A.2d 742 (1972)
(same New Jersey statute precludes granting of divorce when couple continues to reside in same
house even though husband has own bedroom that he keeps locked and to which he has the only
key); In re Estate of Adamee, 291 N.C. 386, 230 S.E.2d 541 (1976) (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1984)
requiring parties to live "separate and apart for one year" interpreted to define cohabitation as living
together as husband and wife in more than sexual terms; brief period of living together for social
purposes (Christmas holidays spent together in family home with children) not enough to terminate
period of separation); Tuttle v. Tuttle, 36 N.C. App. 635, 244 S.E.2d 447 (1978) (same North Caro-
lina statute interpreted to mean separation period terminated if parties resume marital cohabitation,
thereby holding selves out to public as husband and wife); Meyerl v. Meyerl, 21 Pa. D. & C. 3d 729
(Allegheny Co. 1981) (requirement of living separate and apart, defined by statute to mean "com-
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L Filing Fees
The Supreme Court's opinion in Boddie3"7 removed any doubt that
filing fees that prohibit indigents from acquiring a divorce violate liti-
gants' procedural due process rights. The result would be the same were
courts to apply the rigorous scrutiny standard enunciated in Zablocki to
such a restriction. The state interests advanced in support of the fees
included preventing frivolous litigation, allocating scarce judicial re-
sources, and providing defendants with proper notice of the
proceedings.308
The allocation of judicial resources does not rise to the level of a suffi-
ciently important state interest when the alternative is totally precluding
indigents from the only form of dispute resolution available to them in
divorce cases. 3° 9 Therefore, the restriction cannot withstand the scrutiny
applicable to infringements on the fundamental right to divorce. Assum-
ing that the frivolous litigation and proper notice justifications are suffi-
ciently important to justify the fees requirement, the restriction would
still fail strict examination because the restriction is not closely tailored
to the objectives. As the Court noted in Boddie, there is "no necessary
connection" between litigants' assets and the seriousness of suits they
might institute. 310 Furthermore, less restrictive means exist to deter the
filing of frivolous lawsuits, such as actions for malicious prosecution or
abuse of process. 31  The Court also noted that there are effective, reliable
means for providing defendants with notice of pending proceedings, such
as service by mail at the defendant's last known address, that do not rely
on costly service of process by a sheriff.
312
Boddie cannot be interpreted, either as originally decided or under the
standard advanced here, as prohibiting a state from charging fees to
plete cessation of any and all cohabitation[,]" PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 104 (Purdon Supp. 1985),
will not preclude divorce when couple share dwelling during period of separation but do not hold
themselves out to public as husband and wife); Barnes v. Barnes, 276 S.C. 519, 280 S.E.2d 538 (1981)
(statute requiring marriage partners to live "separate and apart without cohabitation" for a period of
one continuous year, S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-10(5) (Law. Co-op Supp. 1983) interpreted to mean
that spouses must live in separate domiciles; living in separate rooms in the marital home, even
without sexual relations does not constitute living separate and apart).
307. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
308. Id. at 381.
309. See id. at 382.
310. Id. at 381.
311. Id. at 381-82. Of course, if the state's concern is frivolous litigation, a threatened civil suit
against a judgment-proof litigant will probably provide little deterrence.
312. Id. at 382.
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those litigants who can afford to pay, even if the fee is higher than that
charged for other civil actions.31 3 Focusing on the Boddie analysis, such
a fee does not foreclose divorce litigants from the only avenue available
to them for the dissolution of their marriage. A fee merely requires that
the litigants pay the cost of the avenue. Similarly, when analyzed pursu-
ant to the Zablocki-type approach, such a fee does not significantly and
directly interfere with, impose a direct legal obstacle upon, or make prac-
tically impossible a procedure seeking dissolution of a marriage. If these
requirements are not met, heightened scrutiny will not be invoked and
the fee will be subjected to a lesser degree of scrutiny. Filing fees for
those able to pay will probably withstand that lower degree of scrutiny
because they represent a reasonable regulation directed to reinforcing
and allocating limited judicial resources. If the state charges a higher fee
for a divorce action than for other civil actions, the fee will still with-
stand scrutiny upon a showing that divorce actions are more costly to the
judicial system than other actions. A crucial element in the validity of
any fee scheme is that the fees be waived for indigents.3 14 Otherwise, the
restriction is merely Boddie revisited and thus, invalid.
2. Time-Related Restrictions
Restrictions relating to time raise the same issue in terms of delay ver-
sus prohibition that was raised in considering age restrictions on mar-
riage.315 In fact, the Court in Sosna noted:
Appellant was not irretrievably foreclosed from obtaining some part of
what she sought .... She would eventually qualify for the same sort of
adjudication which she demanded virtually upon her arrival in the State.
Iowa's requirement delayed her access to the courts, but, by fulfilling it, she
could ultimately have obtained the same opportunity for adjudication
which she asserts ought to have been hers at an earlier point in time.316
The Court was correct. By residing in Iowa a year, Sosna could have
filed for divorce. Likewise, by maintaining domicile in the state where
one desires to be divorced, one may secure a divorce entitled to full faith
and credit in other jurisdictions. By meeting statutory requirements for
living separate and apart for the required length of time litigants may be
granted divorces on no-fault grounds. Therefore, do requirements relat-
313. See, ag., Murillo v. Bambrick, 681 F.2d 898 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982).
314. The fees were not required of indigents on the facts of Murillo, 681 F.2d at 904.
315. See text accompanying supra notes 168-69.
316. 419 U.S. 393, 406 (1975).
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ing to time significantly interfere with the right to divorce justifying ap-
plication of strict scrutiny or are the requirements mere delays?
As with time-related requirements applicable to marriage, time-related
requirements applicable to divorce significantly interfere with the funda-
mental right to divorce. When time requirements delay marriage, the
individual suffers potentially severe losses. For example, children may be
born out of wedlock or, if one of the prospective spouses dies, the other is
not protected by the estate laws of the jurisdiction or accorded either
public or private benefits through the would-be spouse. If one currently
married desires to remarry, time-related restrictions on divorce cause
these same potential losses, just as if the individuals desiring to marry
were marrying for the first time.
In addition, time restrictions on divorce may cause exactly the oppo-
site losses. For example, if a woman is pregnant by a man not her hus-
band and the child is born during the marriage, the child is presumably
the legitimate child of the woman's husband.31 The husband may be
required to support the child after the divorce is granted and the child
may be entitled to a share in the husband's estate. 18 The biological fa-
ther may bear a heavy burden in attempting to prove that he, and not the
mother's husband, is the father of the child. Furthermore, during the
time that the spouses are still married and are waiting for the statutory
time period to be fulfilled so they may divorce, each may be entitled to an
intestate share of the other's property should the spouse die without a
will, or to common-law dower or curtesy rights or to a statutory forced
share if the spouse dies with a will. The surviving spouse may also be
entitled to share in life insurance, pension funds, and government
benefits.
It is not enough, then to state that a time-related divorce requirement
is a mere delay. That delay could prevent one from enjoying the benefits
and protections offered one married to the person of choice and the delay
may impose additional burdens on a spouse who is a spouse in name only
and only for a limited period of time.
a. Residence and Domicile
The Court in Sosna offered a number of state interests in support of the
317. See, eg., ALA. CODE § 26-17-5(a) (1984 Supp.); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-720(a) (1982);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.55(a) (West Supp. 1984).
318. The husband also may be entitled to a share in the child's estate.
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one-year residency requirement: both spouses and possibly children are
interested in and will be affected by the court decree; with so much at
stake, a state has a right to insist that one seeking a divorce have a "mod-
icum of attachment" to the state;319 a residency requirement avoids a
court's intermeddling into the affairs of another state with a stronger at-
tachment to the parties; likewise, requiring that a litigant have an attach-
ment to the decree-granting state will lessen the likelihood that another
state will refuse to give full faith and credit to the divorce decree; and
states have an interest in avoiding a divorce mill reputation.320 Assum-
ing that all of these interests are sufficiently important to withstand the
first prong of the rigorous scrutiny standard, the restriction still fails the
least restrictive means prong.
First, the phrase "modicum of attachment" is too vague to allow a
precise determination of when one is sufficiently attached to a state to
enable the state to grant a divorce without interfering with another
state's concerns. Does residence in a state for one year guarantee that a
court entering a decree is not interfering with another jurisdiction's con-
cerns and that the rights of the other spouse or children of the marriage
are not being overridden? For example, what if the spouse seeking a
divorce is a law student who has resided in the forum state for only one
year before filing for divorce, knowing that two years later, upon gradua-
tion, the student will leave the state to accept employment elsewhere?
Does that represent a "modicum of attachment?"
In addition, the residency requirement, while furthering the state's de-
sire to avoid divorce mill status, will preclude many earnest individuals
from divorcing in the forum state. Ironically, the requirement may drive
litigants to other states with lesser or no residency periods, threatening to
transform the other states into divorce mill jurisdictions. Furthermore, a
residency period will not guarantee that the forum state's divorce decree
will receive full faith and credit in other jurisdictions. The basis of juris-
diction in divorce cases is domicile321 and regardless of the length of time
individuals have resided in a state if they are not domiciled there the
divorce decree may be collaterally attacked in another jurisdiction and
not accorded full faith and credit by that other jurisdiction.32 2 The other
319. 419 U.S. at 406-07.
320. Id. at 407-09.
321. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945); Williams v. North Carolina, 317
U.S. 287, 297 (1942).
322. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. at 229.
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spouse may attack the decree, however, only in instances of ex parte as
opposed to bilateral divorce.323 If then, in Sosna, Mr. Sosna had received
notice and participated in Ms. Sosna's petition for divorce, he would
have been estopped from later challenging the validity of the decree in
other jurisdictions. In most instances there would be no other party in-
terested enough in the proceeding or with standing to challenge it and
the question of full faith and credit therefore would not arise.324
As Justice Marshall noted in his dissenting opinion in Sosna, if a state
wants to protect those concerned with divorce litigation, avoid interfer-
ing in the affairs of other states, protect its own decrees from attack in
other jurisdictions, and avoid becoming a divorce mill, it needs only a
domicile requirement.32 Domicile, presence with the intent to stay in
the forum for an indefinite period of time,326 requires no waiting period.
Furthermore, the intention to stay for an indefinite period of time pro-
vides the indication of attachment a state might require before the state's
courts will hear a petition for divorce.
A domiciliary requirement, however, is not a solution without weak-
nesses. The state's interest in such a requirement-to ensure that the
litigant is sufficiently connected with the forum state to justify the court's
hearing the divorce action-from the perspective of integrity of court
decrees and distribution of judicial resources may rise to the level of "suf-
ficiently important." But, once again, the fit between the restriction and
the objective is not necessarily closely tailored.327 An individual, for ex-
ample the law student referred to above, may be domiciled in one state
while a long-term resident of another state. The student may retain the
domicile merely because there exists no present intent to remain any-
where indefinitely. During the three years of law school, the student is
not domiciled in the state where the school is located so the student may
not secure a divorce there, but may have little real connection with the
domiciliary state. The domiciliary state, however, is the one empowered
to enter the divorce decree. Such problems are of increasing concern in
323. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 351-52, 355-56 (1948).
324. Although the state could challenge a divorce decree through a bigamy prosecution against a
person who obtains such a divorce and then remarries, see, ag., Williams v. North Carolina, 325
U.S. 226 (1945); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942), state prosecutors' offices are
overwhelmed with investigating and prosecuting crimes of a more serious nature than bigamy and
are unlikely to pursue such a matter.
325. 419 U.S. at 424 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
326. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 572 (Rev. 5th ed. 1979).
327. See Garfield, supra note 65.
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our highly mobile society in which, for example, students attend educa-
tional institutions in jurisdictions other than their domicile, or business
executives shuttle from jurisdiction to jurisdiction to work for short peri-
ods of time in their transcontinental corporations' offices.
Any time restraint will cause hardship in some cases,3 28 but because a
state has a sufficiently important interest in protecting all parties subject
to a marital dissolution, in protecting its own decrees from collateral at-
tack, in not interfering with affairs that rightly concern another jurisdic-
tion, and in not becoming a divorce mill, a regulation closely tailored to
serving a state's objectives will withstand strict scrutiny. The key to the
regulation is to determine when a divorce litigant has the sufficient
"modicum of attachment" to a state to permit the state to entertain an
action in divorce. As illustrated above, neither a precise residency period
nor a domicile requirement will serve that purpose. Rather, the courts
should adopt a "minimum contacts" approach similar to that in jurisdic-
tion cases. 329 A divorce litigant would bear the burden of proving con-
tacts with the state that would justify its courts' exercising jurisdiction
over the matter and deciding the divorce case on the merits consistent
with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 33 0  The
standard is a flexible one with which the courts are already experienced
and it serves the states' interests with minimum hardship to the individ-
ual litigants.
b. No-Fault Periods of Separation
State divorce laws may require periods of separation ranging from six
months to five years before a court will entertain an action for divorce on
no-fault grounds.131 In addition, a state may have two standards, one for
couples with minor children and one for couples without minor chil-
dren.332 The state's interest in such time periods is to provide a cooling
328. See supra notes 315-18 and accompanying text.
329. Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186
(1977); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
330. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940); see also International Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at
320.
331. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 32-610 (1983) (living "separate and apart for a period of five (5) years
or more without cohabitation"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 551(7) (1974) ("[w]hen a married person
has lived apart from his or her spouse for six consecutive months and the court finds that the re-
sumption of marital relations is not reasonably probable").
332. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1.611(c) (West 1985) (simplified procedure); VA. CODE § 20-
91(9)(a) (1950) (separate and apart without cohabitation for one year; if no minor children and
parties have entered into separation agreement, separate and apart without cohabitation for six
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off period during which divorce litigants can live apart33 3 and perhaps
reconcile. Reconciliation of broken marriages, especially when those
marriages involve minor children, is clearly an important state interest,
but is the length of time mandated for separation closely tailored to effec-
tuating only that interest or does it amount to an unwarranted infringe-
ment upon the right to divorce?
No magic number in terms of days, weeks, months, or years exists for
separation period requirements. Some marriages are so hopelessly bro-
ken that a separation period of a lifetime would not induce the individu-
als involved to reconcile, while others may be reconciled within a matter
of days. The question that remains is whether the state should mandate a
waiting period of a particular length or whether it should trust the courts
to determine whether the marriages are broken with no hope for
reconciliation.
The arguments that no guarantee exists that courts would be able to
make such determinations and that forcing them to do so will tax already
overcrowded court dockets is tempting. Although courts may sometimes
err and grant a divorce to a couple who could reconcile, or deny a di-
vorce and force an additional period of separation upon a couple who
will never reconcile, these are the types of decisions that society regularly
entrusts to our courts. In any event, even after the mandatory waiting
period, statutes may direct the courts to determine that irreconcilable
differences exist before entering a divorce decree.334
Requiring courts to make such determinations may further expand the
courts' workload. Legislatures might, then, statistically determine an op-
timum period of time to facilitate reconciliation and a time period be-
months). For a proposed restriction on divorce relating to couples with minor children, see infra
notes 336-40 and accompanying text.
333. State statutes may have or may be interpreted as having more than one definition of the
phrase "living separate and apart." See supra note 306 and cases cited therein.
334. In reality, even when courts are required by statute to determine whether irreconcilable
differences exist between partners to a marriage or whether a marriage is irretrievably broken, many
courts do little more than rubber stamp litigants' petitions for divorce once the mandatory separa-
tion period is met. See, eg., Note, Irreconcilable Differences: California Courts Respond to No-Fault
Dissolutions, 7 Lo'. L.A.L. REv. 453, 466 (1974) (reporting that even if one spouse denies that
irreconcilable differences exist between the parties, judges are likely to enter a decree of divorce on
that ground). Replacing uniform waiting periods with individual determinations may, in fact, im-
prove the chances of serving the states' reconciliation interests. Without a presumption of irreconcil-
ability provided by statute, courts may examine more closely the issue of whether the differences
really are irreconcilable. The danger, of course, always exists that removing the mandatory separa-
tion period and replacing it with an individual determination of irreconcilability will only speed the
process of the rubber stamp.
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yond which reconciliation is unlikely to occur. Procedure by
presumption and administrative convenience, however, are not valid rea-
sons for infringing upon fundamental rights.335 Therefore, as with re-
quirements of residency and domicile, individual determinations of an
irretrievable breakdown of a marriage and the impossibility of reconcilia-
tion will serve the states' interests in preserving marriage when possible
without placing overly broad restrictions upon the fundamental right to
divorce.
c. Restrictions Concerning Minor Children
Some states impose longer periods of separation upon no-fault divorce
litigants when those litigants are parents of minor children.336 Such stat-
utes are directed at preserving families and protecting children, surely
sufficiently important state interests. This additional form of procedure
by presumption, however, is not closely tailored to effectuate only those
interests. The restriction may prove to be both over and underinclusive.
A longer waiting period could harm children. During the waiting pe-
riod, rather than reconciling, parents may continue to argue over money,
property, and the children, only increasing the hostilities between them.
Although parents will, in most cases, continue to deal with each other
after the divorce has been granted, a process may begin after divorce
whereby they are no longer adversaries and can communicate civilly. A
long waiting period may also prevent one or both spouses from remarry-
ing or forming other partnerships, perhaps to the children's detriment.
For example, the parents living apart may experience severe financial dif-
ficulties, but one or both parents may be waiting to marry another who
will love and care for the parent and for the children. The requirement is
also underinclusive because if a child's parents do not happen to be mar-
ried to each other, they can dissolve their relationship at any time with-
out any state attention being paid to the preservation of the family or
protection of the children.337
Professor Younger offers an alternative to state mandated separation
periods for parents with minor children.338 She proposes that, in addition
335. Carey, 431 U.S. 678, 691 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976); Stanley v. Illi-
nois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
336. See supra note 332.
337. The state would become involved through the courts, of course, if both parents were to seek
custody of the children, but that involvement would be at the instigation of the parents, not the state,
as is the case with the mandatory waiting period.
338. See Younger, supra note 304, at 90-95.
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to the usual grounds for divorce, parents with minor children must prove
to the court that continuing the marriage would result in exceptional
hardship to either or both of them and would harm the minor children
more than would the divorce.339 Such an individualized approach would
serve the state's important interests in protecting the family and yet
would not be overly broad. Pursuant to this approach, parents would
not be prevented from divorcing for any fixed period of time so long as
they met the hardship requirements. Parents would be forced to try to
resolve their difficulties, if they did not do so voluntarily. If they could
not resolve their difficulties, however, their marriages would not be per-
petuated to the continuing detriment of their children.3"
Although Professor Younger's hardship requirement suggestion nar-
rows the fit between the restriction and the state's objectives, it raises
other concerns. The suggestion does not address the need for family sta-
bility and care for the children of unmarried couples who terminate their
relationship. The proposal may also discourage either marriage or pro-
creation once a couple has married, both of which society views as public
goods. When balanced, however, against the fact that the restriction will
serve the interests of many families, yet not infringe unnecessarily upon
the fundamental right to divorce, the marriage for minor children restric-
tion represents a reasonable compromise.
V. EPILOGUE: A NEW LOOK AT THE NEW LOOK
The Supreme Court in Zablocki held the right to marry to be a funda-
mental right. The Court has traditionally evaluated restrictions upon
fundamental rights using strict scrutiny. Although room for argument
exists concerning the standard of review the Court intended to apply to
state restrictions on marriage, the authorities cited in Zablocki support
review of state restrictions that significantly interfere with the right to
marry with traditional strict scrutiny.
Zablocki, when read in conjunction with Boddie and Kras, also leads
to the conclusion that divorce, too, should be treated as a fundamental
right. State restrictions that significantly interfere with one's attempt to
dissolve the marital relationship, therefore, should be evaluated pursuant
to Zablocki's strict scrutiny standard.
A fundamental right/strict scrutiny approach to the rights to marriage
339, Id. at 90.
340, Id.
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and divorce is the logical result of Zablocki. Reality, however, necessi-
tates a new look at the new look. Most, if not all, state restrictions on
marriage will fail strict scrutiny analysis. In several instances the restric-
tions serve sufficiently important interests, but generally they are not
closely tailored to effectuate only the states' interests. The restrictions
tend to be overinclusive, underinclusive, or both. While restrictions do
prevent individuals from marrying, they do not make families economi-
cally or socially stable, they do not improve the physical health of our
population, and they do not make the operation of our prisons more effi-
cient. In general, the restrictions do not necessarily accomplish any of
the objectives at which they are aimed or, at most, they accomplish
objectives that could be met in less intrusive ways. The same is true of
restrictions on divorce. Although the restrictions serve sufficiently im-
portant state interests, the fit between the restriction and the objective is
not closely tailored to effectuate only those interests.
In reality, the courts probably will not invalidate many of the restric-
tions discussed in this Article. The expense associated with alternative
means of achieving the objectives the state seeks through the restrictions
is prohibitive. State-sponsored genetic and contraceptive counseling,
child care assistance, job training and placement, while all worthy
projects and while all directed at meeting the same goals as a complete
restriction on marriage for those deemed too young or mentally incompe-
tent to marry, would place a substantial burden on already overburdened
state budgets. Also, equally important to the objectives of promoting
stable, healthy families may be society's desire to withhold recognition
and benefits from individuals engaged in relationships of which it does
not approve, whether those individuals desire to marry a close relative,
one of the same gender, or another already married.
How may the Supreme Court's opinion in Zablocki, carried to its logi-
cal conclusions, be reconciled with the reality that legislatures and courts
are not going to lift most restrictions on marriage and divorce, are not
going to provide alternative means of meeting their sufficiently important
interests, and are not going to provide benefits and protections to every-
one who enters into or exits from a marriage? In truth, reconciliation
will be difficult. Therefore, alternatives should be considered to enable
the Court to avoid the results that a logical interpretation of Zablocki
mandates.
First, courts could reinterpret Zablocki to conclude that strict scrutiny
should not be applied to restrictions affecting one's decision to enter into
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or exit from the marital relationship. Rather, courts could adopt the
sliding-scale approach that Justice Marshall advocates and look to "'the
nature of the classification and the individual interests affected' ,,34 in
determining whether a restriction on marriage or divorce is valid. The
sliding-scale approach would provide courts with the flexibility to deter-
mine that in some instances the rights that individuals claim, when bal-
anced against state concerns with financial expenditures or morality, do
not warrant strict, or even heightened, scrutiny. The courts could then
apply the standard of scrutiny deemed applicable to the individual case
and determine that although a restriction on the right to marry or di-
vorce exists, the restriction serves an important (or legitimate) state inter-
est and is sufficiently tailored to serve (or rationally related to) the
interest without unduly restricting the individual's right. Such an ap-
proach, of course, eliminates any element of certainty in deciding mar-
riage and divorce cases. Decisions would be reached on a case-by-case
basis and would rest on the courts' opinion as to the relative weight of
individual interests and state interests.
Courts could also apply Zablocki without invalidating most restric-
tions upon marriage and divorce by defining marriage to match society's
idea of marriage. Marriage would not be defined as a relationship en-
tered into by two persons to be accorded protection and benefits by the
state, but rather as a relationship entered into between two legally com-
petent adults of different gender not closely related to each other and not
already married to another. Once these criteria are met, then those en-
tering into the relationship are entitled to state protection and benefits.
Similarly, courts could define any restriction that impacts on this stan-
dard definition of marriage, for example, a law prohibiting marriage be-
tween two persons of kinship closer than first cousins, as not significantly
interfering with marriage. The person is free to marry anyone other than
close kin (assuming that the desired partner is a legally competent adult
341. Zablocki. 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (quoting Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S.
250, 253 (1974)). Such an approach would also be consistent with Justice Stewart's concurring
opinion in Zablocki in which he advocated looking to
-'the nature of the individual interest affected, the extent to which it is affected, the ration-
ality of the connection between legislative means and purpose, the existence of alternative
means for effectuating the purpose, and the degree of confidence we may have that the
statute reflects the legislative concern for the purpose that would legitimately support the
means chosen."
434 U.S. at 396 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 260 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
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of a different gender and not already married to another) so strict scru-
tiny should not be applicable to the restriction.
Such an approach is flawed, however, because it essentially forecloses
review of the central issue raised. For example, if legislatures were to
define marriage as a relationship between two legally competent adults of
different gender and of the same race not closely related to each other
and not already married to another, the miscegenation issue addressed in
Loving never could have been raised. The question should not be
whether the relationship at issue meets the standard definition of mar-
riage and therefore is entitled to state benefits and protections, but rather
whether the relationship at issue should be recognized as a valid marriage
and afforded such protection.
Finally, the courts could apply Zablocki without upsetting economic
or moral reality evidenced in state restrictions on marriage and divorce
by redefining the state interests that the restrictions promote. Instead of
defining the interests to include promoting stable families, protecting in-
nocent spouses from venereal disease, encouraging childbirth, or safe-
guarding the health of individuals and society, courts could redefine the
state's objective as one of withholding governmental benefits and soci-
ety's approval from relationships that do not conform to the will of the
majority.
The Supreme Court has never decided whether a state's concern with
the morality of its citizenry is an interest sufficiently important or com-
pelling to justify infringing upon an individual's fundamental rights in
the family context. 42 If, however, the state withheld benefits and ap-
proval from nonsanctioned marriages as opposed to prohibiting the mar-
riages, the state could argue that it is not using its powers to enforce its
ideas of morality, but rather is providing benefits to encourage a more
attractive alternative.343
Withholding approval and benefits would not eliminate the relation-
ships. Individuals could enter personal relationships resembling that
which society traditionally defines as a "marriage," regardless of their
alleged legal incompetence, gender, kinship, or current marital status.
342. Developments, supra note 36, at 1209. See id. at 1202-13 for an informative discussion of
state regulation of morality. See also Bratt, supra note 36, at 285-89.
343. Cf Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-75 (1977) (denial of state funds for abortion but provi-
sion of state funds to cover cost of childbirth does not violate woman's right to choose whether or
not to carry a fetus to term; state may encourage "a more attractive alternative" without infringing
on constitutionally protected right).
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The state in this situation would not be infringing upon a couple's right
of association. 3" But, their relationship would not carry with it the bur-
dens and benefits attaching to those society now defines as married.
To adopt such an approach will probably achieve the same results that
current state restrictions on marriage reach: families will not be health-
ier or wealthier, sexual relations between those closely related or of the
same gender will not stop, venereal disease will not be eradicated, prisons
will not become safer, and judicial resources will not be used more con-
structively. States, however, will not be sanctioning, economically or
morally, relationships that society deems objectionable.
344. States could, of course, make such relationships criminal through means such as deviate
sexual intercourse statutes. See supra notes 223 & 231. That action will raise other questions related
to the right of association separate from the rights to marry and divorce.
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